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Network Communication Privacy:
Traffic Masking against Traffic Analysis
by Alfonso Iacovazzi
An increasing number of recent experimental works have been demonstrating
the supposedly secure channels in the Internet are prone to privacy breaking
under many respects, due to traffic features leaking information on the user
activity and traffic content. As a matter of example, traffic flow classifica-
tion at application level, web page identification, language/phrase detection
in VoIP communications have all been successfully demonstrated against en-
crypted channels. In this thesis I aim at understanding if and how complex it is
to obfuscate the information leaked by traffic features, namely packet lengths,
direction, times. I define a security model that points out what the ideal target
of masking is, and then define the optimized and practically implementable
masking algorithms, yielding a trade-off between privacy and overhead/com-
plexity of the masking algorithm. Numerical results are based on measured
Internet traffic traces. Major findings are that: i) optimized full masking
achieves similar overhead values with padding only and in case fragmentation
is allowed; ii) if practical realizability is accounted for, optimized statistical
masking algorithms attain only moderately better overhead than simple fixed
pattern masking algorithms, while still leaking correlation information that
can be exploited by the adversary.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: From Traffic
Analysis to Traffic Masking
A number of works over the last few years have given extensive experimental
evidence that even within a secure channel, a packetized flow leaks information
to an adversary through observation of features of traffic flows, e.g., the ordered
sequence of packet lengths, packet inter-arrival times, packet directions. Based
on these information that is available to an adversary even when the flow is
carried within a secure channel (e.g. SSL/TLS or SSH connections), it has been
shown that a number of approaches yields feasible algorithms to identify the
type of service or application protocol run among a given set of alternatives
(traffic classification). More generally, traffic analysis can identify different
types of user activities within a secure channel, e.g. discriminate between web
navigation versus remote management or file transfer, or even the type of
search carried out by a user of Google within a “secure” web session. Other
privacy breaking attacks based on statistical analysis of packet flow features
have been demonstrated, e.g. to profile web access, to infer language of phone
calls.
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This communication privacy break is a positive proof that ciphering does
not conceal all relevant information of a packetized, discontinuous application
flow; hence in this Thesis I aim at describing the investigation of privacy
protection against traffic analysis I have done during my PhD. Besides being
a privacy issue, traffic analysis tools can be useful to network administrators
and operators for enforcement of security policies and traffic filtering, or to
support quality of service mechanisms. A key point for the robustness of
those “legitimate” uses of traffic analysis tools is to check how much effort
is needed to fool them. Those reasons motivate us to investigate how traffic
feature leakage can be concealed to “adversaries” exploiting traffic analysis.
We term this traffic masking.
Packet length and direction masking can exploit two basic mechanisms:
padding and fragmenting. Padding amounts to the insertion of a number of
extra bit in the packet, that can be stripped off by the recipient so that in-
formation is not corrupted, but such that the adversary measures an altered
value of packet length of the ciphered packet. Padding can come in two forms:
adding bits to a packet provided by a host or creating a fake packet (dummy
packet, that will be discarded altogether at destination). Fragmenting is an-
other form of packet length modification: from a single original packet with
payload L, n packets spring out, with payload lengths Lj , j = 1, . . . , n, such
that L = L1 + · · ·+Ln. Overhead must be added to the newly generated pack-
ets to allow correct reassembly of the original packet at destination1. Masking
of packet inter-arrival times is essentially based on insertion of dummy packets
and delaying of packets. There is a price to be paid for masking via padding
(including dummy packets), fragmentation and delaying: bytes or even entire
1As a matter of example, fragmenting IP packets entails an extra header overhead of 20
bytes for each fragment, after the first one.
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new packets are added to the original traffic flow (byte overhead), and a delay
is imposed to the original packet flow (time overhead).
As for contributions of this Thesis, after analyzing the research field of the
statistical classification for Internet traffic, we formally define the problem of
privacy against traffic classification, thus finding what the ideal traffic masking
should do. Then, we define the achievable performance bounds for a mask-
ing algorithm, by defining an optimization problem to find an ideal masking
algorithm that minimizes overhead cost. The study for finding masking tech-
niques for perfect privacy was first applied only to the packet lengths in a flow
and later extended to all features of the traffic. Following, in order to further
reduce overhead introduced by the algorithms proposed, we have relaxed the
hypothesis of ideal masking to obtain partial masking allowing the control of
information leakage carried by statistical features of the traffic. At the end,
we tackle the problem of masking packet traffic flow carried in an encrypted
channel, irrespective of the application(s) it comes from. After the theoreti-
cal studies, we report in each Section the results obtained with the masking
algorithms developed.
In the rest of this Chapter, we describe what is the state of the art in
the field of traffic analysis, what are the reasons behind the development of
masking techniques, and then we move to describe the state of the art in
privacy preserving against traffic analysis.
1.1 Traffic Analysis: State of the Art
One of the biggest concern in the Internet world is to provide perfect security
to the users, with particular attention to user privacy. The typical answer to
these privacy concerns is to simply encrypt the data going through the network
3
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in order to conceal the information from a possible attacker intercepting traf-
fic. However, this alone is not enough since several features of the encrypted
network data, such as packet sizes, timing, direction of packets, the number
of objects downloaded from a web page, the number of components of these
objects, and the number of connections, can still leak information about the
traffic.
Such side-channel information leaks have been widely studied for a decade,
in the context of secure shell (SSH) [1], video-streaming [2], voice-over-IP
(VoIP) [3], web browsing and others. Particularly, a line of research conducted
by various research groups has studied anonymity issues in encrypted web
traffic. For example, it has been shown that since each web page has a distinct
size, and usually loads some resource objects (e.g., images) of different sizes,
the attacker can fingerprint the page so that even when a user visits it through
HTTPS, the page can be re-identified [4].
Classification is the problem of identifying to which of a set of categories
a new observation belongs, on the basis of a training set of data containing
observations (or instances) whose category membership is known. The indi-
vidual observations are analyzed into a set of quantifiable properties, known
as features.
Traffic analysis and classification have been widely studied and employed in
literature; in [5] we can find an exhaustive survey on the traffic analysis prob-
lem and on the most important protocols, attacks and design issues. Among all
the attacks presented, timing attacks, communication pattern attacks, packet
counting attacks, and intersection attacks are the most used traffic analysis
attacks.
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1.1.1 Application Protocol Identification
As broadband communications widen the range of popular applications, there
is an increasing demand of fast traffic classification means according to the
services that generate data flows [6]. The specific meaning of service depends
on the context and purpose of traffic classification. In case of traffic filtering
for security or policy enforcement purposes, service can be usually identified
with application layer protocol. Another example of usage of application traffic
classification is QoS related to differentiate traffic management according to
services carried by different traffic flows. A sufficiently robust classifier could
be a useful element in implementing differentiated QoS without deploying
complex traffic engineering schemes that require cooperation with end hosts.
Currently available techniques for traffic classification are: port based anal-
ysis, deep packet inspection and statistical based system. Port analysis consists
of examining the port number of TCP/UDP headers and mapping them to
application as defined by ICANN (formerly IANA). This method is becoming
ineffective because of applications running on non-standard ports (e.g. peer-
to-peer). For this matter, traffic classification at application level is based
on the analysis of the entire packet content, header plus payload, by look-
ing for specific application protocol signature. This is so called, deep packet
inspection (DPI). There are widely available tools for such a classification ap-
proach (e.g. L7filter, BRO, Snort [7]). They can be very accurate, but when
catching up with high speed links, i.e. for backbone use (Gbps links), they
result too expensive in terms of computational power and storage resource.
Moreover DPI fails in classifying application carried by encrypted flows (i.e.
Secure VPN). This point and the increasing fraction of traffic carried by ISPs
encrypted within VPN tunnels, makes actual classification system ineffective.
In this scenario statistical approach can be a direction for effective traffic clas-
sification (see [6]).
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Different approaches to traffic classification have been developed, using
information available at IP layer such as packet inter-arrival times, packet
sizes, and overall amount of bytes transferred. Callado et al.[6], present a good
tutorial to approach the problem of traffic classification and point out open
research issues, as well as a comparison in terms of accuracy and completeness
of two identification methods. As for specific traffic classification approaches,
some proposals [8, 9] need complete TCP flows as input (off-line classification).
In [10] Karagiannis et al. developed a heuristic that uses social, functional
and application level behaviors of a host to identify all traffic flows originating
from it. This approach, although really innovative, is tailored onto a specific
source host.
Crotti et al. [11] use only size and inter-arrival time of first m packets to
create a statistical descriptor (a fingerprint) of an application layer protocol.
This fingerprint is then used to measure the similarity of a given flow to the
corresponding protocol.
Moore et al. [9] use a supervised machine learning algorithm, the well
known Na¨ıve Bayes (and its generalization, Kernel Estimation) on a wide set
of characteristics (tens or hundreds), as flow duration, packets inter-arrival
time and payload size and their statistics (mean, variance...). Moreover, they
use a filtering technique to identify the best characteristics to be used with
the mentioned methods.
A number of works [8, 12, 13] rely on unsupervised machine learning tech-
niques as K-means is. McGregor et al. [8] explore the possibility to use cluster
analysis to group flows using transport layer attributes, but they do not eval-
uate the accuracy of the classification. Zander et al. [12] extend this work by
using another Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm named Autoclass.
They also analyze the best set of attributes to use. Both these works only
test Bayesian clustering technique trained by an EM algorithm, which has a
6
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slow learning time. Bernaille et al. [13] use faster clustering algorithms rep-
resenting data in different spaces: K-means and Gaussian Mixture Models
(GMM) for Euclidean space and Spectral clustering in Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) based space. The only features they use are packet size and packet
direction: they demonstrate the effectiveness of these algorithms even using a
small number of packets (e.g. the first four of a TCP connection).
Hidden Markov Model theory is also used in [14]. Packets size and inter-
arrival time are used to build a model describing a given protocol. Even though
this approach can classify encrypted applications, its performance with SSH
flows is 76% detection rate and 8% false negative, which is not as good as with
other common application flows such as WWW and instant messaging.
Alshammari et al [15] attempt to classify/identify applications services
running on SSH by exploiting two supervised learning algorithms such as Ad-
aBoost and RIPPER by relying on IP packet lengths, duration of the flows
and arrival times. Results indicate detection rate up to 99% and 0.7% of false
positive by exploiting RIPPER classifier, but the classifiers work only off-line,
i.e. the entire flow must be available.
Concerning SSH encrypted applications, Dusi et al. [16] approached classi-
fication by exploiting GMM and SVM (Support Vector Machine) based tech-
niques. They achieved accuracy up to 99.2% by analyzing four encrypted
packets after SSH handshake. They collected artificial traffic traces by devel-
oping a tool based on SSH, which forwards four applications (HTTP, POP3,
POP3S and Emule), however the testbed is quite artificial and far from the
actual use of the protocol in real networks.
The flow-based classification mechanisms proposed so far cannot deal with
network-layer tunneling techniques, such as the ones provided by IPsec. The
flows are multiplexed into the same encrypted connection and there is not
a reliable way to reassembly the flows routed through the IPSec channel by
7
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observing only the encrypted traffic.
1.1.2 Webpage Fingerprinting
Beyond the classification of application classes there are other privacy leaking
that have been studied in the literature. For example there are a lot of work
showing how recognize webpages downloaded by a user. In this context an
attacker can fingerprint web pages by their side-channel characteristics, then
eavesdrop on the victim user’s encrypted traffic to identify which web pages
the user visits.
An attack demo was described in a course project report in 1998 by Cheng
et al [17]. Sun et al [4] and Danezis [18] both indicated that this type of
side-channel attack defeats the goal of anonymity channels, such as Tor, Mix-
Master and WebMixes. Sun et al’s experiment showed that 100, 000 web pages
from a wide range of different sites could be effectively fingerprinted. Besides
SSL/TLS, Bissias et al conducted a similar experiment on WPA and IPSec
[19].
Even Hintz in [20] analysed the concept of website fingerprint. When a user
visit a typical webpage, he downloads several files: the HTML file, the images
included in the page, and referenced stylesheets. For example if a user visited
CNN’s webpage at www.cnn.com, he would download 40 separate objects each
with a certain size. The set of transfer sizes for a given webpage comprises that
page’s fingerprint. Webpages with a large number of objects have fingerprints
composed of many different sizes. The more files in a fingerprint, the larger
the chance that the fingerprint will be unique. The Author also states that an
eavesdropper observing the traffic can infer the webpages visited by the client
by observing those fingerprints threatening so users’ privacy.
Liberatore et al. in [21] evaluate traffic analysis techniques that infer
the source of a webpage retrieved under the cover of an encrypted tunnel by
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comparing observed traffic to profiles (fingerprints) of known sites created from
packet lengths, and are referred to as profiling attacks (fingerprinting attacks).
1.1.3 Information Leaks in VoIP Traffic
It is widely accepted that, due to the sensibility of private conversations, VoIP
traffic should be encrypted before transmission over the Internet. The current
focus on VoIP security has centered around efficient techniques for ensuring
confidentiality of VoIP conversations, but no efforts have been done to evaluate
how traffic analysis could threat the privacy of a conversation.
In their article, Wright et al. [22] exploit the fact that using bandwidth-
saving techniques, such as variable bit rate (VBR) coding, implies that the
size of a VoIP packet is directly determined by the type of sound its payload
encodes. In VBR mode, the encoder takes advantage of the fact that some
sounds are easier to represent than others. For example, with Speex, the coder
Authors decided to use, vowels and high-energy transients require higher bit
rates than fricative sounds like “s” or “f”. To achieve improved sound quality
and a low (average) bit rate, the encoder uses fewer bits to encode frames
which contain “easy” sounds and more bits for frames with sounds that are
harder to encode. Because the VBR encoder selects the best bit rate for each
frame, the size of a packet can be used as a predictor of the bit rate used to
encode the corresponding frame. Therefore, given only packet lengths, it is
possible to extract information about the underlying speech.
Again Wright in [3] show that an eavesdropper who has access to neither
recordings of the speaker’s voice nor even a single utterance of the target
phrase, can identify instances of the phrase with average accuracy of 50%.
In [23], White et al. showed how it is possible to derive approximate tran-
scripts of encrypted VoIP conversations by segmenting an observed packet
9
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stream into distinct subsequences representing individual phonemes and clas-
sifying those subsequences by the phonemes they encode.
The approach they pursued leverages the correlation between voiced sounds
and the size of encrypted packets. Specifically, they showed how it is possi-
ble to segment a sequence of packet sizes into subsequences corresponding
to individual phonemes and then classify these subsequences by the specific
phonemes they represent. Then authors proved the possibility of segment-
ing such a phonetic transcript on word boundaries to recover subsequences of
phonemes corresponding to individual words and map those subsequences to
words, thereby providing a hypothesized transcript of the conversation.
In their approach, first a maximum entropy model is used to segment
the sequence of packet sizes into subsequences corresponding to individual
phonemes. Then a combination of profile hidden Markov models and maxi-
mum entropy is applied to classify each subsequence of packet sizes according
to the phoneme the subsequence represents, resulting in an approximate pho-
netic transcript of the spoken audio. The hypothesized transcript is improved
by applying a trigram language model over phonemes (and phoneme types)
which captures contextual information, such as likely phoneme subsequences,
and corrects the transcript to represent the most likely sequence of phonemes
given both the classification results and the language model. Next, the re-
sulting transcript is segmented into subsequences of phonemes corresponding
to individual words using a phonetic constraint model. Finally, each sub-
sequence is matched to the appropriate English word using a phonetic edit
distance metric.
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1.2 Traffic Masking: State of The Art
As outlined in the previous Paragraph, a number of works over the last years
have given extensive experimental evidence that an encrypted packetized flow
leaks information about the user activity to an observer through the ordered
sequence of packet lengths, packet inter-arrival times, packet directions and
other detectable features. Due to the features analyzed, this communication
privacy break is a positive proof that ciphering does not conceal all relevant
information of a packetized traffic flow.
By quantizing these features (e.g., padding packets to fixed sizes), the
amount of information that is leaked can be minimized, but at the cost of
degrading the efficiency and performance of the underlying network protocols.
Certainly, one can pad all encrypted packets such that their sizes are always
equal to that of the maximum transmission unit (MTU), but for many network
protocols doing so would more than double the amount of data sent. For these
protocols, such excessive padding is simply not a satisfactory solution to the
problem.
Moreover, the performance of encrypted network protocols often takes
precedence over privacy concerns in practical applications. While it may be
possible to allow users to tune the tradeoff between efficiency and privacy to
their liking, there is often no clear meaning in terms of the levels of privacy
and performance associated with such actions. As a consequence of this bias
towards efficiency, several security-oriented network protocols have been found
to leak more information about the underlying data than originally thought.
1.2.1 Existing Masking Architectures
Some countermeasures against traffic analysis are already supported by the
main architecture of communications encryption, such as SSH, TLS and IPSec.
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The countermeasures used have the main purpose of concealing the loss of
information determined by the lengths of the packets exchanged.
SSH: RFC 4253 [24] specifies that padding can be of arbitrary length,
such that the total length of packet is a multiple of the cipher block size or
8, whichever is larger. There MUST be at least four bytes of padding. The
padding SHOULD consist of random bytes. The maximum amount of padding
is 255 bytes. In the basic OpenSSH implementation, the padding length will
depend on the payload and the cipher block size. So although the padding
itself is random, the final packet size will be just a step function of the payload
size.
SSL: Also the specifications of TLS protocol (versions 1.1 and 1.2) de-
scribed in RFCs 4346 and 5246, offer the possibility to add some padding in
order to alterate the packet lengths. Even here, padding that is added to force
the length of the plaintext must be an integral multiple of the block cipher’s
block length. The padding may be any length up to 255 bytes. The choice of
possible techniques for adding padding is left to the discretion of the individual
implementations. GnuTLS is one of the most famous secure communications
library implementing the SSL, TLS protocols. If properly enabled, it allows
to add a random padding with uniform distribution.
IPSec: IPSec is a standards of network level that provides various cryp-
tographic algorithms in order to provide security services. Even IPSec allows
to add a random padding with uniform distribution.
In 2007, Kiraly et al. [25, 26] have proposed a new framework based on
IPSec, which allows to integrate techniques of Traffic Flow Confidentiality
(TFC). The authors have designed a new architecture that can be considered
as a specific substrate maintaining backward compatibility with traditional
IPsec implementations. The developed architecture is structured into two main
modules: one deals with the logical control of TFC procedures and algorithms,
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while the other one performs all the functionalities for alterating the features
of the input packets. This latter module is, in turn, divided into several
components, each of which allows to:
1. queue packets before sending,
2. extract the packets from the queue according to a timing procedure,
3. manage packet lenghts with the possibility of introducing padding,
4. generate dummy packets.
The framework has been developed into the Linux kernel, fully integrated with
IPSec in order to take advantage of all features offered by it.
An interesting architecture to support communications like VoIP and In-
stant Messaging such that it can be robust against traffic analysis, was con-
ducted by Danezis et al. and is described in detail in [27]. The basic idea of
this framework is to create a social network consisting of a number of nodes,
each of them is in contact with a set of friends through a connection consid-
ered unobservable by an adversary, whilst all other connections, called bridges,
are observable. This structural hypothesis of the network can offer unobserv-
ability, i.e. an opponent will not be able to understand who is talking to
whom.
In order to fully ensure unobservability, the framework provides the op-
portunity to integrate padding and dummying techniques such as full padidng
or those described in [28]. No delaying support is provided to prevent timing
attacks.
Other works have been developed in recent years [29], to ensure unob-
servable communications by an unauthorized third party and under certain
13
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assumptions. The architectures proposed aim mainly at not allowing identi-
fication of the source and/or receiver nodes for a given flow. For this reason
problems relating to traffic analysis are often not thorough.
1.2.2 Trivial Algorithms
There are some easy countermeasure with padding mechanisms that are not
easily supported in existing encrypted network protocol standards due to the
amount of padding added [30]. In this scenario, we assume the countermeasure
will be capable of managing fragmentation and padding of the data before
calling the encryption scheme.
• Linear padding: All packet lengths are increased to the nearest multiple
of 128, or the MTU, whichever is smaller.
• Exponential padding: All packet lengths are increased to the nearest
power of two, or the MTU, whichever is smaller.
• Mice-Elephants padding: If the packet length is T ≤ 128, then the packet
is increased to 128 bytes; otherwise it is padded to the MTU.
• Pad to MTU: All packet lengths are increased to the MTU.
• Packet Random MTU padding: Let M be the MTU and ` be the input
packet length. For each packet, a value r ∈ {0, 8, 16, . . . ,M − `} is
sampled uniformly at random andthe packet length is increased by r.
1.2.3 Recent Algorithms Proposed
During the years various countermeasures have been developed. Some of them
are feature distribution-based as the work of Wright et al. [28]. They presented
two novel suggestions as improvements upon traditional per-packet padding
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countermeasures: direct target sampling (DTS) and traffic morphing (TM).
On the surface, both techniques have the same objective. That is, they aug-
ment a protocol’s packets by chopping and padding such that the augmented
packets appear to come from a pre-defined target distribution (i.e., a differ-
ent web page). Ideally, DTS and TM have security benefits over traditional
per-packet padding strategies because they do not preserve the underlying
protocol’s number of packets transmitted nor packet lengths.
Direct target sampling: Given a pair of web pages A and B, where A is
the source and B is the target, we can derive a probability distribution over
their respective packet lengths, DA and DB. When a packet of length Li is
produced for web page A, we sample from the packet length distribution DB
to get a new length L′i. If L
′
i > Li, we pad the packet from A to length Li and
send the padded packet. Otherwise, we send L′i bytes of the original packet
and continue sampling from DB until all bytes of the original packet have been
sent. Wright et al. left unspecified morphing with respect to packet timings.
Traffic morphing: Traffic morphing operates similarly to direct target sam-
pling except that instead of sampling from the target distribution directly, we
use convex optimization methods to produce a morphing matrix that ensures
we make the source distribution look like the target while simultaneously min-
imizing overhead. Each column in the matrix is associated with one of the
packet lengths in the source distribution, and that column defines the target
distribution to sample from when that source packet length is encountered. As
an example, if we receive a source packet of length Li, we find the associated
column in the matrix and sample from its distribution to find an output length
L′i. One matrix is made for all ordered pairs of source and target web pages
(A,B). The process of padding and splitting packets occurs exactly as in the
direct target sampling case. Like the direct target sampling method, once the
source web page stops sending packets, dummy packets are sampled directly
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from DB until the L1 distance between the distribution of sent packet lengths
and DB is less than 0.3.
Again with the idea to camouflage the web page visited by a user, Luo et
al. [31] propose a new strategy to obfuscates the encrypted traffic by exploiting
the protocol features in TCP and HTTP. They developed a new framework
able to modify statistical features of an original flow by using a set of traf-
fic transformations both at the application and at the transportation layer.
For a given flow, it can be applied a transformation as combination of these
techniques: packet padding and/or fragmentation, HTTP Range, MSS negoti-
ation, advertising window, message retransmissions, HTTP pipelining, packet
delay.
Shui Yu et al.[32–34] implemented a new strategy of packet padding aiming
at offering perfect anonymity on web browsing. Their proposal comes from the
fact that users generally access a number of web pages at one web site according
to their own habits or interests. This has been confirmed by applications of
web caching and web page prefetching technologies. The proposed solution
allows to disguise the fingerprints of web sites at the server side by injecting
predicted web pages that users are going to download as cover traffic, rather
than using dummy packets as cover traffic. So Authors conclude that from a
long term viewpoint, this novel strategy wastes limited bandwidth and causes
limited delay.
Instead, Zhang at al. [35] contrast traffic analysis by means of traffic
reshaping technique. By exploiting multiple virtual MAC interfaces, an appli-
cation flow is dynamically subdivided in a set of new flows and then dispatched
among these interfaces, and different traffic features are reshaped on each vir-
tual interface to hide those of the original traffic.
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1.2.4 Open Problems
Although a significant amount of previous work has investigated the topic
of Traffic Analysis countermeasures, and specifically the case of preventing
website identification attacks, the results were largely incomparable due to
differing experimental methodology and datasets.
Furthermore, in [30] Dyer et al. show that it is still possible to classify
traffic flows after masking. They consider nine masking countermeasures ap-
plied to web pages, and adopt some machine learning algorithms (Na¨ıve bayes,
multinomial Na¨ıve bayes and support vector machine) to identify which of two
web pages was downloaded. Accuracy of 98% is obtained, and they conclude
that more investigation is necessary to effectively conceal the whole informa-
tion leakage.
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Chapter 2
Classification Problem
A sequence of works detail a variety of Traffic Analysis attacks, in the form
of classifiers that attempt to identify the application generate a flow over an
encrypted channel (see Chapter 1). These classifiers use supervised machine
learning algorithms, meaning they are able to train on traces that are labeled
with the destination website. Each algorithm has a training and a testing
phase. During training, the algorithm is given a set {(X1, w1), (X2, w2), . . . ,
(Xn, wn)}, where each Xi is an vector of features and wi is a label. During
testing the classification algorithm is given a vector Y and must return a label.
In our case, a vector Xi contains information about the lengths, timings, and
direction of packets in the encrypted connection containing an application
flow, and the format of a vector Xi is dependent upon the classifier. In the
remainder of this Chapter, we describe the model of the traffic flow classifier,
define which are the features usable for classification and give the maximum
success probability of the ideal flow classifier. At the end we briefly present
the machine learning used for the performance evaluation in this Thesis and
describe the dataset creation process.
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2.1 Model of a Traffic Flow Classifier
We consider a packet network where we identify two end points (hosts) running
a given application. The information flow between the two hosts is ciphered
and authenticated (message authentication). In spite of using a secure channel
for communication, still there is information leaking to an adversary observing
the information flow between the two hosts.
Any application traffic flow between an initiator entity A and the responder
entity B (e.g., client and server for the given flow, respectively) can be cast
into a sequence of N ≥ 1 message bursts1. Each burst consists of one or more
messages in the A→ B direction or in the opposite direction B → A. Bursts
in the two opposite directions alternate, starting from the initial burst sent
by the initiator A to the responder B. Figure 2.1 depicts an example of two
flows, where A and B sides are represented by vertical lines and time increases
downward.
A full description of the flow is obtained with:
• the vector K = [K1, . . . ,KN ] of the number of messages in each burst;
• message lengths in each burst, denoted as Li = [Li(1), . . . , Li(Ki)], for
i = 1, . . . , N ;
• message epochs2, denoted as Ti = [Ti(1), . . . , Ti(Ki)], for i = 1, . . . , N ;
the time origin is set as the time epoch associated to the first packet
of the entire flow, i.e., T1(1) = 0; therefore, Ti(r) represent the time
elapsed since the beginning of the flow up to the r-th message of the i-th
burst (relative timing). We will use also message gap times, defined as
∆ti(r) = Ti(r + 1)− Ti(r), for r = 1, . . . ,Ki, with Ti(Ki + 1) ≡ Ti+1(1).
1We use the generic term “message”, since the model is applicable to general traffic flows,
from web pages to IP layer flows.
2In practice, time epochs refers to time-stamps associated to packets collected by the
adversary at the traffic flow capture point within the network.
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Figure 2.1: Examples of message exchanges of two application flows: (a)
one way data transfer, like http; (b) alternate message sending, like most
signaling and control protocols.
In the example flows shown in Figure 2.1 the flow labeled (a) has N = 4,
with K = [1, 3, 1, 1]. For flow (b) it is N = 6 and K = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
A more compact description is obtained by considering only burst sizes
Bi =
∑Ki
r=1 Li(r) and burst epochs Θi = Ti(1), for i = 1, . . . , N ; hence a
feature vector X = [B,Θ].
2.2 A General Model of an Application Flow
Let the feature vector associated to a flow be X. According to our definition,
a full description of the flow entails X = [K,L,T]. In general, the feature
vector can be a subset of the full description, according to adversary aims and
resources, e.g., for real time classification only the first m messages of a flow
could be considered, with m typically ranging from one up to several units.
21
2. Classification Problem
In case of web pages classification, more aggregate features could possibly be
used by the adversary, e.g., the amount of bytes sent per burst or even the
overall amount of bytes sent with the flow in either direction.
Each entry of X is modeled as a positive, discrete random variable3 with
a finite support [1, . . . , `] for some suitable constant `. Let Ω denote the state
space of X.
We define a privacy model, where each flow can belong to one of M classes.
An adversary can observe flow features by means of network traffic analysis
and aims at identifying the class each flow belongs to. The example we focus
on is flow classification, where the classes are applications, but results of this
Section hold in general for classification problems.
Let us consider M applications, denoted by a label A ∈ {A1, . . . ,AM}.
We let pj(x) = P(X = x|A = Aj), x ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . ,M , be the probability
distribution function (pdf) of the feature vector, conditional on the flow be-
longing to the j-th application; we further denote with Pj = P(A = Aj) the a
priori probability that a flow belongs to application Aj .
In general, the traffic masking operation includes introducing dummy flows,
to modify the a priori probabilities Pj into new values Qj , and transforming
each flow sent through the network so that the output flow features are given
by Y = φ(X;A), thus altering the original feature pdf. The flow transfor-
mation implies message padding, fragmenting, insertion of dummy messages,
message delaying. This transformation and the relevant modification of fea-
ture values can depend in general on the application the input flow belongs
to, which must be known at the masking device. This is made explicit by
highlighting the parameter A in the mapping φ(·;A). This mapping induces a
3WhileK and L are natively discrete, the time valuesT can be made discrete by specifying
a time quantum, e.g., the time measurement resolution or a small multiple thereof.
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probability measure on Y, denoted by qj(y) = P(Y = y|A = Aj). We assume
that the state space of Y is the same as that of X, namely Ω.
As matter of example, if X reduces only to message lengths, a possible
transformation is padding, i.e., Y = X + U, U being a non negative vector,
whose characteristics depend on the application X belongs to.
We assume an eavesdropping adversary, aiming at flow classification. The
adversary can observe ciphered and masked flows (including dummy flows)
and can detect the feature vector y for each observed flow. In other words,
the adversary can collect samples y of the random variables Y. Moreover,
the adversary knows ciphering and masking algorithms used in the secure
channel, and is given knowledge of the conditional pdfs of the masked flow
features qj(·)4. The aim of the adversary is to guess the application the original
flow belongs to. This is summarized by an algorithm named TA(Y) : Ω →
{1, . . . ,M} yielding the application label for the observed masked flow feature
vector.
An overall scheme of the masking plus enciphering at sending side is shown
in Figure 2.2. The reverse operations (deciphering and de-masking) take place
at receiver side, the latter by using overhead information, e.g., to identify
dummy messages and padding. Dummy flows are added to modify the a pri-
ori pdf Pj into Qj , for j = 1, . . . ,M . Ideally, the Qj ’s should be uniform
(Qj = 1/M). Coupled with perfect masking this brings the adversary success
probability of correctly classifying observed flows to its theoretical minimum
1/M . If dummy flows are suppressed to save overhead, the a priori application
pdf can be exploited by the adversary, if known. Clearly, if one class is over-
whelmingly more probable the the others, simple guessing gives the adversary
4As a matter of example, the adversary has a database containing a set of masked flows for
each application, with metadata assessing the application that originated those flows; such
a database can be used to train a classification algorithm; this is similar to a known/chosen
plaintext eavesdropper model, depending on the way the database is constructed.
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Figure 2.2: Traffic flow masking block scheme at sending side: dummy
flows are added to modify the a priori pdf of generating applications.
a high success probability, i.e., the endpoint traffic is highly predictable.
Given the adversary model above, by full masking we mean removing any
information leakage that could be exploited by the adversary to classify ob-
served flows. With full masking, the success probability of the adversary is
minimized to 1/M . Conversely, partial masking lets some information leak by
establishing a trade-off between privacy and feasibility/complexity/overhead-
/delay of masking. We also define ideal masking an algorithm that makes use
of the knowledge of the whole feature vector of a flow to mask every message
of it, whereas practical masking refers to the subset of algorithms that can
run in real time, by processing messages of the masked flow as they arrive,
independently at the two endpoints. A practical masking algorithm can use
features of the first k messages to decide on masking of the (k + 1)-th one.
In the next Section we define the adversary classifier function TA(·) with
maximum probability of success and derive conditions on the masking trans-
formation φ(·;A) for full masking.
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2.3 Success Probability of the Ideal Flow Classifier
Application traffic flow classification can be cast into a hypothesis test prob-
lem, with simple hypotheses A = Aj . This is the classical Nyman-Pearson
test, that is known to be the optimum (Uniformly Most Powerful) test for this
kind of problem [36]. The state space Ω is partitioned into M decision regions
Di, such that the adversary sets TA(y) = i iff y ∈ Di, i = 1, . . . ,M . Then,
the probability of success of the statistical test is
Psucc =
M∑
i=1
Qi
∑
y∈Ω
P(TA(y) = i|A = Ai) =
M∑
i=1
Qi
∑
y∈Di
qi(y) (2.1)
Let us assume that there exists y¯ ∈ Di such that Qiqi(y¯) < Qjqj(y¯) for
some j 6= i. Then, we can replace the decision regions Di with D′i = Di \ {y¯},
D′j = Dj
⋃{y¯} and D′k = Dk, k 6= i, j. The value of Psucc with these new
decision regions is
P ′succ =
M∑
i=1
Qi
∑
y∈D′i
qi(y) ≥ Psucc (2.2)
This shows that the decision algorithm TA that maximizes Psucc must
define decision regions according to Di ≡ {y : Qiqi(y) ≥ Qjqj(y) ∀j 6= i}.
With these regions, we have
Psucc =
∑
y∈Ω
max{Q1q1(y), . . . , QMqM (y)} (2.3)
The success probability can be minimized by making the decision variable
Y = φ(X,A) such that q1(y) = · · · = qM (y). With this choice the success
probability reduces to max{Q1, . . . , QM}, that is the value obtained by simple
biased guessing. If further dummy flows are added so as to obtain Qi =
1/M , then Psucc = 1/M . This value is achievable with a trivial classification
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algorithm that guesses A at random. The equalization of the probabilities Qi
can be obtained by adding dummy flows as follows. With no loss of generality,
assume P1 ≥ P2 ≥ · · · ≥ PM and5 P1 > 1/M . For each flow sent out a dummy
flow is produced with probability 1 − 1/(MP1); the dummy flow is of class i
(i.e., it has the same statistical properties of flows generated by application i)
with probability (P1 − Pi)/(MP1 − 1) for i = 2, . . . ,M .
Summing up, perfect privacy or full masking, as we name it here means
that any leakage about application is removed off the masked flow features
and entails finding a transformation of the original flow so that the output
features have a same pdf irrespective of the input application, i.e., Qi = 1/M
and q1(y) = · · · = qM (y), i = 1, . . . ,M .
2.4 Machine Learning based Classifiers
In this Section the classification techniques that have been used in this work
to evaluate information leakage before and after masking will be presented.
2.4.1 Na¨ıve Bayes Classifier
A Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is a simple probabilistic classifier based on applying
Bayes’ theorem with strong (Na¨ıve) independence assumptions. A more de-
scriptive term for the underlying probability model would be “independent
feature model”. In simple terms, a Na¨ıve Bayes classifier assumes that the
presence (or absence) of a particular feature of a class is unrelated to the
presence (or absence) of any other feature, given the class variable.
Given a training set x = (x1, . . . , xn) such that each instance xi is described
by M features {f i1, f i2, . . . , f iM} that can take numeric or discrete values.
5If P1 = 1/M , then all Pi would be equal to 1/M and there would be no need of dummy
flows.
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Assume now that there are K known classes of interest. Let C = {c1, . . . ,
cK} represent the set of all known classes. For each observed instance xi there
a known mapping C : RM → C representing the membership of instance xi
to a particular class of interest.
Bayesian statistical conclusions about the class ck of an unobserved flow
y = {f1, f2, . . . , fM} are based on probability conditional on observing the flow
y [9]. This is called the posterior probability and is denoted by p(ck|y). The
celebrated Bayes rules gives a way of calculating this value:
p(ck|y) = p(ck)f(y|ck)∑
ck
p(ck)f(y|ck)
(2.4)
where p(ck) denotes the probability of obtaining class ck independently of the
observed data (prior distribution), f(y|ck) is the distribution function (or the
probability of y given ck ) and the denominator acts as a normalizing constant.
The goal of the supervised Bayes classification problem is to estimate
f(y|ck), k = 1, . . . ,K given some training set x. To do that, Na¨ıve Bayes
makes certain assumptions on f(·|ck) such as independence of fm’s, leading to
f(y|ck) =
∏M
m=1 f(fm|ck), and the standard Gaussian behavior of them. The
problem is then reduced to simply estimating the parameters of the Gaussian
distribution and the prior probabilities of ck’s. All model parameters (i.e., class
priors and feature probability distributions) can be approximated with relative
frequencies from the training set. These are maximum likelihood estimates of
the probabilities.
The discussion so far has derived the independent feature model, that is,
the Na¨ıve Bayes probability model. The Na¨ıve Bayes classifier combines this
model with a decision rule. One common rule is to pick the hypothesis that is
most probable; this is known as the maximum a posteriori or MAP decision
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rule. The corresponding classifier is the function classify defined as follows:
classify(y) = argmax
ck
p(ck|y) = argmax
ck
p(ck)
M∏
m=1
f(fm|ck) (2.5)
2.4.2 K-Means Classifier
In the following, we describe a classification system trained by an unsupervised
(clustering) procedure. This approach has been adopted by a number of other
works (see Chapter 1) and it’s a useful benchmark and performance comparison
tool. When dealing with patterns belonging to Rn we can adopt a distance
measure, such as the Euclidean distance. Moreover, in this case we can define
the prototype of a cluster as the centroid (the mean vector) of all the patterns
in the cluster, thanks to the algebraic structure defined in Rn. Consequently,
the distance between a given pattern xi and a cluster Ck can be defined as
the Euclidean distance d(xi;µk) where µk is the centroid of the mk patterns
belonging to Ck:
µk =
1
mk
∑
xi∈Ck
xi (2.6)
One of the simplest, yet powerful, algorithms for K-clustering is the K-means.
This algorithm performs the following steps, given a set A of patterns:
1. Initialization. It consists in initializing K centroids, by randomly select-
ing K different patterns in the data set A. At this stage each cluster is
empty.
2. Main loop. For each pattern xi in A:
Compute the closest centroid:
h∗ = arg max{d(xi, µh)} (2.7)
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Assign the pattern xi to the cluster Ch∗ represented by the centroid µh∗ .
3. Centroids’ update. For each cluster, compute µk by eq. 2.6.
4. Verify stop condition. If a predefined stop condition is true then stop;
otherwise go to step 2.
Usually the stop criterion is defined as the logical OR of the two following
conditions:
• A predefined maximum number of loops (epochs) have been performed.
• The average displacements of the centroids between two successive iter-
ations does not exceed a predefined threshold:
K∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣µnewj − µoldj ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ (2.8)
A direct way to synthesize a classification model on the basis of a training
set Str consists in partitioning the patterns in the input space (discarding
the class label information) by a clustering algorithm (in our case, by the K-
means). Successively, each cluster is labeled by the most frequent class among
its patterns. Thus, a classification model is a set of labeled clusters (centroids).
More than one cluster can be associated with the same label, i.e. a class can
be represented by more than one cluster.
Since in the K-means algorithm the number K of clusters in the final
partition must be fixed in advance before running the training procedure, K is
a critical parameter and it directly represents the structural complexity of the
classification model, i.e Σ{K}. Assuming to represent a floating point number
with four bytes, the amount of memory needed to store a classification model is
K×4×(n+1) bytes, where n is the input space dimension and assuming to code
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class labels with one byte. An unlabeled pattern x is classified by determining
the closest centroid µi (and thus the closest cluster Ci) and by labeling x with
the same class label associated with Ci. It is important to underline that,
since the initialization step of the K-means is not deterministic, in order to
compute a precise estimation of the performance of the classification model
on the test set Sts, for a given value of K the whole algorithm must be run
several times, averaging the classification errors on Sts yielded by the different
classification models obtained in each run.
Considering this classification system as the core, it is possible to derive a
version able to automatically choose the optimal structural complexity, i.e. the
number of clusters to be used in the K-means clustering procedure by adopting
the s-fold cross-validation. To this aim we can compute the previously defined
performance measures pi,j for each value of K belonging to a considered range
of reasonable values [Kmin,Kmax]; these measures can be arranged into a
matrix Π of size (Kmax −Kmin + 1)× s:
Π =

pKmin,1 pKmin,2 . . . pKmin,s
pKmin+1,1 . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . .
...
pKmax,1 pKmax,2 . . . pKmax,s
 (2.9)
Performance of the classification model with structural complexity equal
to k is computed as the row average of Π:
pi(k) =
1
s
s∑
j=1
pi,j (2.10)
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The optimal number of clusters to be used in the classification model is
determined as follows:
k∗ = arg max
Kmin≤k≤Kmax
pi(k) (2.11)
We define the pi,j ’s as accuracy measures, i.e. we let
pi,j =
# of correctly classified patterns in Sts
cardinality of Sts
(2.12)
In case of i clusters and of the j-th validation experiment of the s-fold
cross-validation. Then, the model having the best generalization capability is
the one corresponding to the maximum value in the pi(k) sequence.
2.4.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression
In statistics, a multinomial logit (MNL) model, also known as multinomial
logistic regression, is a regression model which generalizes logistic regression
by allowing more than two discrete outcomes. That is, it is a model that is used
to predict the probabilities of the different possible outcomes of a categorically
distributed dependent variable, given a set of independent variables.
In machine learning, when a classifier is implemented using a multinomial
logit model, it is commonly known as a maximum entropy classifier. Maximum
entropy classifiers are commonly used as alternatives to Na¨ıve Bayes classi-
fiers because they do not assume statistical independence of the independent
variables (commonly known as features) that serve as predictors. However,
learning in such a model is slower than for a Na¨ıve Bayes classifier, and thus
may not be appropriate given a very large number of classes to learn. But
in our case this classifier suites perfectly. In particular, learning in a Na¨ıve
Bayes classifier is a simple matter of counting up the number of occurrences of
features and classes, while in a maximum entropy classifier the weights, which
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are typically maximized using maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation, must
be learned using an iterative procedure.
If the multinomial logit is used to model choices, it relies on the assumption
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which is not always desirable.
This assumption states that the odds of preferring one class over another do
not depend on the presence or absence of other “irrelevant” alternatives. For
example, the relative probabilities of taking a car or bus to work do not change
if a bicycle is added as an additional possibility. This allows the choice of K
alternatives to be modeled as a set of K-1 independent binary choices, in which
one alternative is chosen as a “pivot” and the other K-1 compared against it,
one at a time.
The idea behind the multinomial linear regression, as in many other statis-
tical classification techniques, is to construct a linear predictor function that
constructs a score from a set of weights that are linearly combined with the
explanatory variables (features) of a given observation using a dot product:
score(xi, ck) = βk · xi = β0,k + β1,kx1,i + β2,kx2,i + · · ·+ βM,kxM,i (2.13)
where xi is the vector of features to be labeled, βk is a vector of weights
(or regression coefficients) corresponding to outcome ck, and score(xi, ck) is
the score associated with assigning observation i to class ck. The predicted
outcome is the one with the highest score.
Specifically, it is assumed that we have a series of N observed data points
(x1, . . . , xN ). Each data point i consists of a set of M explanatory variables,
or features, xi = (x1,i, . . . , xM,i), and an associated categorical outcome ck,
which can take on one of K possible values, that is, there K classes.
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To arrive at the multinomial logit model, imagine, for K possible out-
comes, running K−1 independent binary logistic regression models6, in which
one outcome is chosen as a “pivot” and then the other K − 1 outcomes are
separately regressed against the pivot outcome. If we choose the outcome cK
as the pivot we have that 1− p(ck|xi) = p(cK |xi) and we can write:
ln
(
p(c1|xi)
p(cK |xi)
)
= β1 · xi
ln
(
p(c2|xi)
p(cK |xi)
)
= β2 · xi
. . .
ln
(
p(cK−1|xi)
p(cK |xi)
)
= βK−1 · xi
(2.16)
If we exponentiate both sides, and solve for the probabilities, we get:
p(c1|xi) = p(cK |xi)eβ1·xi
p(c2|xi) = p(cK |xi)eβ2·xi
. . .
p(cK−1|xi) = p(cK |xi)eβK−1·xi
(2.17)
6Binary logistic regression is a type of regression analysis used for predicting the outcome
of a binary categorical criterion variable based on one or more predictor variables. The
probabilities describing the possible outcome of a single trial are modeled, as a function of
explanatory variables, using a logistic function. Since we are in a binary environment we
have only two classes c1 with probability p(c1) and c0 with probability p(c0) = 1−p(c1). Let
p(c1|xi) be the probability of xi belonging to c1, then the model can be written as:
ln
(
p(c1|xi)
1− p(c1|xi)
)
= logit(Pi) = β1 · xi (2.14)
we can then rewrite the model in terms of in terms of the probability of the outcome occurring
as:
p(c1|xi) = e
β1·xi
1 + eβ1·xi
(2.15)
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Using the fact that the K probabilities must sum to one, we find:
p(cK |xi) = 1
1 +
∑K−1
k=1 e
βk·xi
(2.18)
We can use this to find the other probabilities:
p(c1|xi) = eβ1·xi1+∑K−1k=1 eβk·xi
p(c2|xi) = eβ2·xi1+∑K−1k=1 eβk·xi
. . .
p(cK−1|xi) = e
βK−1·xi
1+
∑K−1
k=1 e
βk·xi
(2.19)
The unknown parameters in each vector βk are typically jointly estimated
by maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation, which is an extension of maxi-
mum likelihood using regularization of the weights to prevent pathological so-
lutions (usually a squared regularizing function, which is equivalent to placing
a zero-mean Gaussian prior distribution on the weights, but other distributions
are also possible). The solution is typically found using an iterative procedure
such as iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS) or, more commonly these
days, a quasi-Newton method such as the L-BFGS method.
2.4.4 Random Forest
The random forest machine learner developed by Leo Breiman and Adele Cut-
ler, is a meta-learner; meaning consisting of many individual learners (trees).
The random forest uses multiple random trees classifications to votes on an
overall classification for the given set of inputs. In general in each individual
machine learner vote is given equal weight. The forest chooses the individ-
ual classification that contains the most votes. Figure 2.4 below is a visual
representation of the un-weighted random forest algorithm.
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Figure 2.3: Meta Learner
Given a dataset of samples (or instances) each consisting of a label and M
features, individual random tree machine learners are grown in the following
manner:
1. A data set called inBag is formed by sampling with replacement members
from the training set; this technique is often referred to as “bootstrap-
ping”. The number of examples in the inBag data set is equal to that of
the training data set. This new data set may contain duplicate examples
from the training set. Using the bootstrapping technique, usually one
third of the training set data is not present in the inBag. This left over
data is known as the out-of-bag data oob.
2. If there are M input variables, a number m M is specified such that
at each node, m features are selected at random out of the M and the
best split (e.g., the attribute maximizing the Information Gain) on these
m is used to split the node. The value of m is held constant during the
forest growing.
3. Each tree is grown to the largest extent possible. There is no pruning.
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Figure 2.4: Sample with replacement
This process is repeated to develop multiple individual random tree learn-
ers. After the development of the tree, the oob examples are used to test the
individual’s trees as well as the entire forest. The average misclassification
over all trees is known as the oob error estimate. This error estimate is useful
for predicting the performance of the machine learner without involving the
test set. This information could be found useful in determining the weights of
the individual trees classification in the weighted random forest learner.
Breiman also proved that the forest error rate depends on two things:
• The correlation between any two trees in the forest. Increasing the
correlation increases the forest error rate.
• The strength of each individual tree in the forest. A tree with a low error
rate is a strong classifier. Increasing the strength of the individual trees
decreases the forest error rate.
Reducing m reduces both the correlation and the strength. Increasing it
increases both. Somewhere in between is an “optimal” range of m, which
usually is quite wide. Using the oob error rate a value of “m” in the range
can quickly be found. This is the only adjustable parameter to which random
forests is somewhat sensitive.
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2.5 Dataset Creation
To define a reliable application data set, we have used real traffic traces col-
lected at different locations, including:
• NetLab laboratory premises in the campus of “Sapienza”, University of
Rome;
• Information Engineering department at “Sapienza” University of Rome7;
• Elsag Datamat main site in Rome8;
• private homes.
This way we encompass several major kinds of Internet access points: in-
stitutional, business and domestic. All of these collected traces consist of real
traffic, generated by means of some tools in controlled conditions, so that it
is possible to build up data sets with guaranteed label metadata of collected
flows (ground truth). A reliable ground truth data set is needed to train
supervised machine learning algorithms as the ones used on this work. The
controlled traffic generation is a must specifically for collecting traces of appli-
cation flows carried within encrypted tunnels, i.e. to label each SSH flow with
a metadata specifying the service it is carrying among SCP, SFTP and HTTP.
A data set for our purposes is composed by a collection of flows, along with
metadata per flow, reporting the application layer protocol the flow belongs
to, the timestamp of its first packet (T0), the capture date and location.
7Information Engineering Department and NetLab are located in different places within
Rome and trace route tests prove that several routers are crossed between the two places
8Elsag Datamat is a company of the Finmeccanica group, www.elsagdatamat.com
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2.5.1 Application Traffic Collection
TCP applications data set is composed by HTTP, FTP-Control Session, POP3
and SSH flows. As for HTTP and FTP-Control Session (FTP-C in the fol-
lowing), we have collected traffic flows originating from clients in the NetLab
at DIET Department in the campus of University of Rome Sapienza. The
internal network is made up of a switched Ethernet with about thirty stations
configured as clients and servers. The internal network is connected to the
campus network by means of a 10 Mbps link and from there to the public In-
ternet via University backbone. Tens of users are active daily in the NetLab.
Traffic traces have been collected on the link between NetLab edge router and
the University backbone access router.
By means of automated tools mounted on machines within NetLab, thou-
sands of web pages have been downloaded in a random order, over thousands
of web sites distributed in various geographical areas (Italy, Europe, North
America, Asia). FTP sites have been addressed as well and control FTP ses-
sion established with thousands remote servers, again distributed in a wide
area. In addition two thousands POP3 flows were collected by capturing traf-
fic generated by different users of NetLab network who handled e-mails during
several work days. The artificial traffic (HTTP and FTP-C) as well as POP3
traces have been sniffed from our LAN switch by configuring a mirroring port.
We have verified that the TCP connections bottleneck was never the link con-
necting our LAN to the outside network (access link).
2.5.1.1 SSH Traces
We address different network scenarios using multiple client-server couples to
capture SSH traffic. In order to have realistic traces and technology indepen-
dent implementations of SSH (version 2) protocol, we have used computers
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Figure 2.5: Platform used to generate SSH traffic: SSH server is inside the
University campus network; clients are at University, Elsag Datamat and a
private home premise, respectively.
with heterogeneous operative systems, namely Linux and Windows. We sim-
ulate SSH connections by connecting three client computers deployed in three
different LANs to one server located in a fourth different LAN. As shown in
Figure 2.5, client LANs and SSH server have been connected to the Internet
by using different geographic links.
We have run the following SSH services: SCP, SFTP and HTTP over
SSH. SCP and SFTP are transfer file services natively available on OpenSSH
[37]. In particular we downloaded/uploaded files from clients to server using
both SCP and SFTP protocols collecting eight thousands flows. HTTP over
SSH traces have been collected downloading web pages through SSH tunnels
(one SSH tunnel for each HTTP session). This way we have collected four
thousands SSH flows carrying HTTP traffic. Throughout these experiments
we have considered flows without SSH compression feature. Besides these SSH
flows, a tool to automatically generated remote management traffic has been
developed. It aim at providing parallel connections to different SSH servers
making us able to manage several SSH sessions at the same time. This brought
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us to choice Java technology for the development of the system. SSH based
management is supported by all operative systems (such as LINUX kernel
2.6, Windows 2003/2008), but it is often used for remotely configure routers
and network devices, for example IOS CISCO can be handled by SSH remote
connection.
Each operative system is characterized by its configuration commands,
therefore an automatic procedure to remotely manage device’s console must
provide different lists od commands according to the technologies deployed
in the network. For this reason the tool provides multi-dictionary mapped
on a dedicated database. It stores all information about accounts for logging
to devices as well as appropriate commands for the different configurations.
To each command is associated a weight pointing out the relevance of the
commands itself out of the rest of the complete dictionary. The tool has been
set up with constant weight for each command. This means that tools types
every commands with the same probability.
Regarding time settings, it is possible to set what we defined as thinking
times, enabling tool to send characters every Th1 seconds and commands every
Th2 seconds. Th1 and Th2 have been set up as equally distributed variables
between 0 and 1 s and 0 and 10 s respectively. Setting times this way, put the
classification system working in the worst case, in fact it cannot take advantage
of the recognition about statistical behavior of the human behavior in thinking
and typing commands.
For traffic generation and collection of traces, the tool has run on the
platform depicted in Figure 2.6 in which several technology of Servers and
Routers have been deployed. The network is managed by several ISP domains
and devices are those commonly used in the real networks. The collection of
traces, as in the other cases has, been made though a mirroring port of the
edge switches.
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Figure 2.6: Platform used to generate SSH remote management traffic.
2.5.1.2 Real Time Application IP Flows: VoIP
The ground truth of the real time applications has been built of artificial VoIP
traffic traces. During this phase, we realized three different platforms to get
the RTP flows9:
• clear mode VoIP;
• the Secure VoIP.
Clear mode VoIP traffic traces have been collected by realizing the network
depicted in 2.7 the tools used are:
• commercial softphone (Xlite and Ekiga) to realize call by a PC. Several
accounts have been activated to exploit the service of free VoIP calls
through the Internet.
• Traditional telephone connected to the PSTN.
• AMTEC IP Phone registered on a SIP public account.
9The signaling traffic of the protocol has not been taken into account
41
2. Classification Problem
Figure 2.7: Clear mode VoIP platform.
We have approached the following call cases:
• Calls between the softphones in different geographic locations of the
Internet, collecting RTP traces about the entire VoIP communication.
• Calls between the softphones and the traditional phone, collecting (in
the IP phone side of the network) RTP flows coming and going to the
PSTN network.
To make a realistic and complete analysis, calls have been run by using
all the codecs available, namely: G.729, G.726, GSM, iLBC. Codecs affect the
IP packet lengths and the arrival times. The latter highly depends on the
network conditions.
The collection of the traces have been made through the edge switch that
is very close to the local softphone used for the tests. As in the previous cases
the mirror port enabled us to gather pcap traces format.
In order to realize secure VoIP calls, we exploited the VoIP infrastructure
of Elsag Datamat. The simplified network diagram is shown in picture 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Secure VoIP platform.
On this network the IP PBX and the IP phones are based on Amtec technol-
ogy. In particular, the company IP PBX held in the intranet site of Abbadia
San Salvatore (Siena, Italy) and IP phones are placed all over the company’s
intranet. Sites mainly are in Rome, Genoa, Naples etc. All the calls between
sites are established by the IP PBX over the company’s MPLS and Internet
networks.
On this scenario, having the control of the IP-PBX configuration as well
as some of the IP Phones located in Rome, enabled us to run secured VoIP
calls.
More in details, we were able to access only the IP phones in Rome and we
forced the communication through theses phones and outgoing calls toward
the IP PBX. Having configured the devices with secure VoIP allowed us to
get encrypted calls. SRTP traffic has been captured near of one of the two
conversation end points and the IP packets are saved in the tcpdump format.
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2.5.2 Traces Pre-processing
A key issue in setting up a useful training data set is pre-processing the col-
lected packet features. From a qualitative point of view, application related
information contained in the collected traces should be isolated from TCP
and network related effects, e.g. TCP ACK only segments or TCP control
segments (e.g. three-way handshake packets), end-to-end round trip times,
retransmissions triggered by TCP.
Hence, we remove from each flow F the following packets: i) first two
packets carrying TCP three-way handshake messages: PK0 = SY N, PK1 =
SY N − ACK ii) TCP ACK packets, i.e. those packets carrying only a TCP
level ACK and no payload data, that can be recognized because their length
is equal to LSY N ; iii) retransmitted packets, that can be recognized because
their RTX flag is set to one. An example of this first processing phase is given
in Figure 2.9.
Let LACK be the length of the TCP ACK packets (it can be found as
LACK ≡ min2≤j≤Γ−1 Lj) and T0 the time stamp of PK0, i.e. the SY N packet.
Then, the pre-processed data relevant to a given flow F = {〈dj , Lj , Tj〉.j =
0, . . . ,Γ − 1} are: PK∗j−2 = 〈dj , λj = Lj − LACK ,∆tj = Tj − T0〉 for j =
2, . . . ,Γ − 1. Packet lengths are so decreased by the TCP+IP header length
(including possibly options), so as to return the actual application related data
length. Packets turning out to have λj = 0 are discarded (they are just TCP
ACK’s). Let P denote the set of indices of pre-processed packet features with
positive length. Then the pre-processed flow is F∗ = {〈dj , λj ,∆tj〉 j ∈ P}.
After tests and analysis of results we set the target value of P ≡ |P| to strike
a convenient trade-off between high classification accuracy and an acceptable
classification delay. As our approach is intended to be used in real time, we
set a maximum value of P equal to ten. As for SSH traces, we have created
a different dataset composed of records extracted from SSH flows only. Since
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Figure 2.9: Preprocessing of a P = 3 TCP application flow.
SSH traffic has been generated in controlled way, we know exactly which service
is tunneled within each SSH connection. This is the only way we can define
a reliable ground truth for encrypted data sets. As we are indeed interested
only in those packets that carry the first few encapsulated segments of the
tunneled service, we must start collecting packets only after the SSH signaling
that triggers the opening of a new forwarding channel. This is a critical point,
due to the fact that last packets of SSH handshake phase are encrypted and
they can be confused with application data. Moreover SSH offers a wide range
of algorithms for encryption and authentication, and this complicates further
the detection of the end of SSH handshake phase.
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2.6 Performance Metrics
Efficiency can be measured by the average amount of overhead introduced by
masking:
E[OH] =
∑M
i=1
∑ωi
h=1 pi,h
[
|φ(x(i)h ; i)| − |x(i)h |
]
∑M
i=1
∑ωi
h=1 pi,h|φ(x(i)h ; i)|
(2.20)
where |u| equals the sum of the components of u, pi,h = P(X = x(i)h |A = Ai)
can be estimated from the collected flow for each application and applications
have been assumed equiprobable (Pi = 1/M). By taking x
(i)
h as the packet
lengths we get the byte overhead ; when times are used, we get the time over-
head.
Information leakage against flow classification is measured as follows. Ac-
cording to Section 2.1, the adversary defines a classifier TA yielding the ap-
plication deemed to have generated the observed (masked) flow. Let ηi,j =
P(TA = Aj |A = Ai) for i, j = 1, . . . ,M and let H = [ηi,j ] be the flow clas-
sifier confusion matrix. Diagonal elements represent success probabilities of
the classifier, while off-diagonal elements are mis-classification probabilities. A
flow classifier corresponds to a discrete information channel that maps input
flows (A “symbols”) into classification decisions (TA “symbols”) and is there-
fore described by the matrix H. By assuming the a priori pdf for application
be uniform, i.e. Qj = 1/M, j = 1, . . . ,M , the average mutual information of
this “information channel” can be computed as:
I(A;TA) = log2M +
1
M
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
ηi,j log2
(
ηi,j
ηj
)
(2.21)
where ηj =
∑M
r=1 ηr,j . In the following we consider the normalized mean mu-
tual information Iˆ(A;TA) = I(A;TA)/ log2M , which is just the fraction of
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the mean mutual information of the perfect classifier that a real classifier at-
tains. With this definition, Iˆ(A;TA) = 0 in case of perfect masking, while
Iˆ(A;TA) = 1 for the perfect classifier. We consider also the probability Psucc
that the adversary correctly classifies the flow application, that can be com-
puted as
Psucc =
1
M
M∑
j=1
ηj,j (2.22)
Computation of both last metrics requires a matrix H, hence an instance
of flow classifier which exploits the masked flow features. We use four clas-
sification algorithm (Na¨ıve Bayes, Logistic Model Trees, Random Tree and
K-means) offered in the WEKA implementation, which is a machine learning
workbench distributed under the GNU General Public License [38]. Each ma-
chine learning was trained by feeding it with masked flows, so that it can learn
to recognize any information that possibly leaks from the set of the masked
flow features, that is to say after the application of the masking algorithm.
This is consistent with the usual security approach where the adversary is
granted knowledge of the security algorithm, i.e. the traffic masking algorithm
in our case.
47

Chapter 3
Masking for Perfect Secrecy
In this Chapter we focus on masking techniques providing Perfect Secrecy.
Initially we analyze the masking of the only packet lengths, first by describing
the trivial algorithm with fixed packets length, and after we state an optimiza-
tion problem to find the full masking algorithm that minimizes the average
overhead within the set of ideal algorithms. In the second part we extend to
all the traffic features (lengths, times, and direction of packets) the algorithms
analyzed. Finally we discuss the results obtained.
3.1 Packet Length Masking
As discussed in previous Sections, packet length is the main statistical feature
leaking information about what application originates packets, even if flows
are encrypted. We refer to the general model of attack described in Section
2.1 and now we briefly resume it.
We assume a quite general setting, where we can identify origin and des-
tination secure networks (each possibly reducing to a single device), where
application endpoints are located (see Figure 3.1). In between there is an
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Figure 3.1: Scenario for the privacy attack on the packet traffic.
insecure network, where the attacker can observe all flowing packets and at-
tempt to break the privacy of the information flows carried in the insecure
network. Confidentiality of packet payload is protected by encryption, but
we concede the attacker can identify boundaries of application layer flows, i.e.
the attacker can select packets making up a single session of an (unknown)
application protocol out of the aggregated packet traffic observed on a net-
work link. Then, the attacker can apply statistical classification to identify
the specific application that has originated the flow, even though she can not
read into the packet payloads. We want to prevent this attack, specifically the
information leakage given by the packet lengths. We consider packet padding
and/or fragmentation to mask this information.
Since in this Section we are restricting the problem to only packet lengths,
the description of the flow entails X = [K,L,T] expressed in Section 2.1 can be
simplified with the relation X = [L] = [L1, . . . , LW ] where W is the maximum
number of packets of a flow.
3.1.1 Fixed Packet Length
Here we consider a practical approach to remove all information leaked by the
packet length values, namely fixed length masking. This amounts simply in
fragmenting and padding all incoming packets into packets of fixed length L0.
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Masking algorithm with fixed length works as follows. For the r-th packet
of a flow, if Lr < L0 the algorithm adds a padding of length L0−Lr, if Lr = L0
the packet is not modified, whilst if Lr > L0 it fragments the packet into
dLrL0 e − 1 segments of length L0 plus one segment of length L∗r ≤ L0 to which
it will add a padding of length L0−L∗r . At the end of masking, the algorithm
generates n =
∑m
i=rdLrL0 e ≤ mdLrL0 e packets. Practical values of maximum
packet lengths is Lmax = 1500 bytes for most widespread access networking
technology. To keep notation simple, without losing generality, Lmax ≡ `. The
number n, which is directly proportional to the amount of bytes transmitted
for each flow, can be easily exploited by the classifier in order to discover the
class that generated the flow. So fragmentation is not sufficient, it is also
necessary to mask the total number n of packets corresponding to the original
m packets taken into account.This can be done by adding dummy packets of
size L0.
Let us consider two applications A1 and A2. Let Ni be the random variable
representing the number of packets with fixed length L0 bytes corresponding
to a flow generated by application Ai, i = 1, 2. To anonymize the output
flow we can add a random number Dr of dummy packets with fixed length L0
bytes, so that N1 + D1 and N2 + D2 have the same probability distribution.
In Section 4.1.1 and [39] the following theorem is proved:
Theorem: Let pii(k) be the Probability Mass Function (PMF) of the ran-
dom variable Ni and Fi(k) the corresponding Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion (CDF), for k = 1, ..., ν and i = 1, 2. For any couple of non negative
random variables D1 and D2 such that N1 + D1 ∼ N2 + D2 ∼ P , we have
E[P ] ≥ E[P ∗] where FP ∗(k) ≡ min{F1(k), F2(k)}, k = 1, . . . , ν.
By using statistics of the probability distributions of the number of fixed
length packets Ni yielded by application Ai, it is possible to compute the
minimum number of additional dummy packets required to anonymize each
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flow by using the algorithm 1 which is detailed in Section 4.1.1.
3.1.2 Optimum Solution
Also in the following we focus on the case of two applications (M = 2) and
state an optimization problem that yields a constructive solution for a full
masking algorithm φ(·;A) that achieves minimum overhead in the set of ideal
masking algorithms. This optimal full masking algorithm serves as a term
of comparison for practical masking, while it is unfeasible to realize, both
because of computational complexity and since in principle it requires the
entire flow to be available to the masking device to decide upon each message
transformation.
Let us assume the sample space (with non null probability) of application
i be Ωi and let ωi = |Ωi| be the cardinality of Ωi, for i = 1, 2. Outcomes of Ωi
are denoted x
(i)
r , r = 1, . . . , ωi (i = 1, 2). For typical application flows, most
feature values have null or negligible probability so that ωi  |Ω|. As found in
Section 2.1, full masking entails that the output flow features have the same pdf
irrespective of the application that feeds the input of the masking device. To
construct the masking algorithm φ(·;A) we take all ordered couples (x(1)h ,x(2)k ),
with x
(1)
h ∈ Ω1 and x(2)k ∈ Ω2, for h = 1, . . . , ω1 and k = 1, . . . , ω2. For each
couple (x
(1)
h ,x
(2)
k ) we find the optimum masked flow with feature vector yh,k
that the flows in the couple can be mapped to by means of padding (including
insertion of dummy messages) and/or fragmentation Optimum here refers to
minimization of the overhead required to convert each of the two flows of the
couple into the masked flow yh,k. Full masking is obtained by requiring that
P(Y = yh,k|A = A1) = P(Y = yh,k|A = A2) ≡ ch,k for all h and k. Then, we
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have
P(Y = yh,k) = P(A = A1)P(Y = yh,k|A = A1)
+ P(A = A2)P(Y = yh,k|A = A2) = ch,k. (3.1)
Optimal full masking is obtained by finding the values of ch,k that optimize
the average cost of masking, z′ = E[D(Y) − D(X)]. Here D(·) represents a
“cost” measure associated to the flow features. Since the input flow are given,
we can reduce the target function to z = E[D(Y)] =
∑
h,k ch,kDh,k, where
Dh,k ≡ D(yh,k) and ch,k = P(Y = yh,k). Let yh,k = [λh,k] in the case of only
packet lengths masking. Then, we aim at optimizing byte overhead and we
get Dh,k = |λh,k|.
Summing up, given the costs Dh,k, the probabilities ch,k are found by
solving the following linear optimization problem (global optimization):
z =
ω1∑
h=1
ω2∑
k=1
ch,k ·Dh,k (3.2)
subject to constraints:
0 ≤ ch,k ≤ 1 ∀(h, k)
ω2∑
k=1
ch,k = p1,h, h = 1, ..., ω1
ω1∑
h=1
ch,k = p2,k, k = 1, ..., ω2
where p1,h = P(X = x(1)h ), h = 1, . . . , ω1 and p2,k = P(X = x(2)k ), k =
1, . . . , ω2.
We can relate the above optimization problem to the well-known Trans-
portation Problem [40], with the only difference that in our case we have the
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quantities to “transport” expressed as fractions of the total amount. The prob-
lem at hand is easily solved by the Simplex Method. No efficient solution are
known for M > 3.
The problem is now reduced to find a constructive way to define the flow
yh,k that minimizes Dh,k given the two input flows x
(1)
h and x
(2)
k for all values
of (h, k) (local optimization). We have set up an exhaustive search to solve
the local optimization that turns out to be feasible in case the feature vector
is in the order of a dozen components. This gives us sufficient material to
use statistical full masking as a comparison benchmark to understand basic
trade-offs.
We can summarize the ideal masking algorithm for two applications in the
following steps:
1. take as input a flow ϕ belonging to application 1, with features x
(1)
h∗ (or:
flow ψ belonging to application 2 with features x
(2)
k∗ );
2. draw a random index in the set [1, ω2] of value k
∗ with probability
ch∗,k∗/p1,h∗ (or: in the set [1, ω1] of value h
∗ with probability ch∗,k∗/p2,k∗);
3. transform the input flow ϕ (or: ψ) into the output masked flow ξ with
features yh∗,k∗ .
The asterisk highlights that the probabilities ch,k have been obtained by
solving the global optimization (3.2) and the table yielding the output masked
flow patterns has been filled up by solving the local optimization for any couple
of input flows (x
(1)
h ,x
(2)
k ).
3.1.3 Results
In this Section we restrict ourselves to an adversary exploiting packet lengths
of the first m packets of each flow, hence X = [L1, . . . , Lm]. The results are
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Applications Pair Optimum full Optimum full Fixed length
masking (FAP) masking (PO) masking
HTTP - SSH 0.3191 0.3605 0.4591
HTTP - FTP-c 0.4088 0.4126 0.5328
HTTP - POP3 0.4351 0.4392 0.5629
HTTP - VoIP 0.3864 0.4126 0.5406
SSH - FTP-c 0.3008 0.3162 0.5378
SSH - POP3 0.3495 0.3715 0.5700
SSH - VoIP 0.2353 0.3546 0.5049
FTP-c - POP3 0.2094 0.2336 0.5302
FTP-c - VoIP 0.2303 0.2752 0.4891
POP3 - VoIP 0.2477 0.2477 0.4892
HTTP over SSH - SFTP 0.2090 0.2248 0.5205
Table 3.1: Average amount of overhead introduced by different packet size
masking algorithms for various couple of application flows (FAP = Fragmen-
tation And Padding; PO = Padding Only).
obtained with m = 5, which is consistent with a real time flow classification
target. Albeit restricted, this scenario is enough to highlight interesting issues.
Also, packet lengths appear to be the most powerful feature in classification
problem.
In Table 3.1 we compare the average byte overhead required by the different
masking algorithms. The numbers represent the fraction of the output bytes
due to masking overhead (Definition 2.20).
Optimum full masking as defined in Section 3.1.2 comes in two different
ways. In the first case, we apply both fragmentation and padding when con-
structing optimum output flow yh,k paired with input flows x
(1)
h and x
(2)
k (local
optimization). In the second case, only padding (including dummy packets)
is allowed. All considered approaches lead to full masking of traffic flows as
regards the packet length information. The metric to compare different ap-
proaches is therefore the average amount of overhead. As a further comparison
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Figure 3.2: Comparison between the average overhead obtained by mixing
five different couples of applications. The average overhead as defined in eq.
(2.20) is plotted as a function of the fixed masked packet length L0.
we include fixed packet length masking. In Table 3.1 unrestricted optimum
full masking is given in the first column, padding only optimum full masking in
the second column, while fixed length masking is reported in the third column.
The fixed length L0 used by the fixed length masking algorithm in Table
3.1 is chosen so as to minimize the average overhead for each masked traffic
mix. Figure 3.2 shows the average overhead as a function of packet length
L0 for three different couples of applications that are mixed (HTTP-FTP-c,
VoIP-FTP-c, SSH-POP3). There is an optimum choice of L0, since for very
small values the overhead due to fragmentation (additional IP packet headers)
is dominant, whereas for large values of L0 padding is dominant. In any case,
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the average amount of overhead is quite large, never less than about 0.5, i.e.
about 50% of all bytes sent out by the traffic flow masking device are overhead
bytes.
Results in Table 3.1 point out that the amount of overhead can vary signif-
icantly depending on the applications mix. In any case, fixed length masking
roughly doubles the required overhead with respect to optimal masking, thus
showing the optimization of full masking, if possible, can bring significant
efficiency gains. An interesting outcome of results in the Table is that opti-
mum full masking constrained to use padding only does not cause a significant
increase in overhead compared to the unrestricted optimum full masking, in
which we can fragment packets. In a lot of cases, adding fragmentation im-
proves marginally the achieved fraction of overhead. This is a strong argument
advocating the use of padding only, although this is not intuitive at first. Main
reason is that full masking requires not only masking the length of each packets
of the flow but also the amount of bytes of the entire flow.
3.2 All Features Masking
Algorithms seen in the previous Section to mask only the lengths can be eas-
ily generalized to all the features in the format presented in 2.1. The two
algorithms generalized can be found in the next Subsections.
3.2.1 Fixed Pattern
A much simple approach, but supposedly far from the optimal solution, is fixed
pattern masking. Fixed pattern masking is the generalization of the algorithm
fixed length masking seen in Section 3.1.1. In general, it means that the input
flow, whatever its class, be forced to be framed into a pre-defined pattern
with features y0 = [K0,L0,T0]. Enforcement of these features is obtained
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practically as follows. Upon emission of a given burst, the sending application
entity has one or more messages. By using fragmenting, padding and delaying
those messages are sent according to the desired fixed pattern. If at any given
time, an output message must be issued while there are no input bytes to be
sent, a dummy message is emitted.
Imposing such a fixed pattern to input flows generated by whatever appli-
cation is certainly possible and it is guaranteed to raze any possible information
useful to the classification adversary and it can be applied message by message.
So fixed pattern masking is practical, full masking. The choice of the values
of the fixed pattern features y0 influences the resulting overhead and delay. In
general, the choice of y0 leading to minimal overhead is a multi-dimensional
optimization problem, given the overall mix of traffic that it is expected at
the masking device. Special cases of the fixed pattern, that simplify its imple-
mentation, are obtained by setting a fixed values for all burst sizes, message
lengths and message gap times.
3.2.2 Optimum Solution
The generalization of the optimum masking for all the features can be achieved
in a trivial way by replacing the vector of the lengths X = [L] with the complete
vector X = [K,L,T] in the optimization problem.
Here again Optimal full masking is obtained by finding the values of ch,k
that optimize the average cost of masking, z′ = E[D(Y) −D(X)]. D(·) rep-
resents a “cost” measure associated to the flow features. The target function
can be reduced to z = E[D(Y)] =
∑
h,k ch,kDh,k, where Dh,k ≡ D(yh,k) and
ch,k = P(Y = yh,k). Let yh,k = [κh,k, λh,k, τh,k]. Then, if we aim at optimizing
byte overhead we have Dh,k = |λh,k|; if we are interested in minimizing time
overhead (delay), we take Dh,k = max{τh,k}.
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Given the costs Dh,k, the probabilities ch,k are found by solving the same
problem of global optimization described by the relation 3.2 in Section 3.1.2
solvable by the Simplex Method.
Exhaustive search can be applied to solve the local optimization also for
the complete set of features. Then, the ideal masking algorithm for all features
of the traffic in case of two applications, follows in an identical manner the
three steps of the algorithm 3.1.2 for only the packet lengths.
A key limitation of ideal masking algorithms is the requirement to have
the entire flow available to decide on masking, before sending out any message
to the network. This cannot work for transactional, interactive applications,
where a message burst is produced by the application entity based on previ-
ously received bursts from the remote entity.
3.2.3 Results
In this Section we report about performance of the algorithms for perfect
secrecy. In Table 3.2 we compare optimum full masking and fixed pattern
masking1. For fixed pattern, the same burst size is chosen and independently
optimized for each flow direction.
Table 3.3 reports the average overhead for a fixed pattern masking with
fixed values of the burst sizes in the two directions (client to server and server
to client). The values of the burst sizes are optimized according to the traffic
mix, as shown in the Table.
Figure 3.3 shows the average overhead as a function of burst size (equal
for all bursts, in both directions) for various application mixes. Figure 3.4
plot the average overhead as a function of the two independent values of burst
sizes that can be set in the two opposite directions. The graphs highlight that
1In Section 4.2.2 these results will be compared with those obtained with burst by burst
masking algorithms.
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Application Pair Optimum full Fixed Burst
masking Size
HTTP - SSH 0.3663 0.5059
HTTP - FTP-c 0.4104 0.5844
HTTP - POP3 0.4233 0.5951
HTTP - VoIP 0.4080 0.5571
SSH - FTP-c 0.3022 0.6082
SSH - POP3 0.3489 0.6285
SSH - VoIP 0.2936 0.5657
FTP-c - POP3 0.1869 0.5263
FTP-c - VoIP 0.2231 0.4872
POP3 - VoIP 0.2700 0.4987
HTTP over SSH - SFTP 0.2752 0.5187
Table 3.2: Average overhead introduced by full and fixed burst size mask-
ing algorithms for various application mixes.
Application Pair Opt. Burst Opt. Burst Minimum
Size A → B Size B → A Overhead
HTTP - SSH 268 1500 0.4933
HTTP - FTP-c 114 1500 0.5599
HTTP - POP3 114 1500 0.5216
HTTP - VoIP 218 1500 0.5383
SSH - FTP-c 142 168 0.6589
SSH - POP3 105 168 0.6427
SSH - VoIP 142 168 0.5904
FTP-c - POP3 120 273 0.6238
FTP-c - VoIP 200 201 0.4926
POP3 - VoIP 200 100 0.6129
Table 3.3: Optimized burst sizes in the two directions and average overhead
of fixed pattern masking.
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Figure 3.3: Fixed pattern masking average overhead of various traffic mixes
as a function of the fixed burst size.
there is a big margin of efficiency gain by properly selecting burst sizes, espe-
cially if the two dimensional optimization is used, by allowing different value
of the burst sizes in the two directions. Even after optimization, overhead
values are quite high, but interestingly they are not terribly larger than those
of locally optimized additive masking. On the other hand, with fixed pattern
masking leakage is stopped completely and implementation complexity is def-
initely lower than in the much more sophisticated additive masking, that uses
statistical information to optimize overhead.
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Figure 3.4: Fixed pattern masking: average overhead for the mix SSH-
VoIP as a function of the burst sizes in the two directions.
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Chapter 4
Partial Masking
Complete flow masking for Perfect Secrecy can imply massive overhead and/or
significant delay, as shown by quantitative examples in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.3.
In addiction the algorithm for optimum masking cannot work for transactional,
interactive applications, where a message burst is produced by the application
entity based on previously received bursts from the remote entity.
Next we introduce some practical, partial masking algorithms that allow to
reduce amount of overhead and delay at the cost of leaking some information
about the content of a flow. The algorithms presented in this Chapter are
practically applicable to a message/burst only based on features of previous
messages/bursts.
First, as in the previous Chapter, we analyze practical algorithms for
packet length masking (Subsection 4.1), and after we generalize the problem
to all the feature of a flow (Subsection 4.2). Neither case leads to full masking,
since at least correlations among features of different packets/bursts cannot
be fully masked.
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4.1 Packet Length Masking
The problem of packet length masking is depth in this Section. First we de-
fine the optimum padding problem for Marginal Probability Mass Functions
(PMFs), independently applicable to the length of each packet (Subsection
4.1.1); after we extend the proposed solutions to the case in which the condi-
tional PMFs are considered instead of just marginal ones, so as to eliminate
at least for one-step dependencies (Subsection 4.1.2). In the Subsection 4.1.3
we introduce an algorithm to mask input traffic only partially, so as to knob a
trade-off between overhead and degree of masking. At the end the results are
presented (Subsection 4.1.4).
4.1.1 Additive Masking for Marginal PMFs
Let us briefly resume some notation. We consider M application layer pro-
tocols Ai for i = 1, . . . ,M . As for the packet lengths, we assume application
layer entity of each protocol can be characterized by a probability measure.
Let L
(i)
r be the random variable representing the length of the r-th packet of
a flow generated by application protocol i, r ≥ 1 and i = 1, . . . ,M . For any
random variable L we let FL(n) = P(L ≤ n) be the cumulative probability
distribution function for n ≥ 0.
We consider only packet length padding, so that lengths of packets of the
anonymized flow are given by Y
(i)
r = L
(i)
r + U
(i)
r , where the U
(i)
r ’s are non
negative random variables in general. The value of U
(i)
r can be a function of
L
(h)
j for j ≤ r and h = 1, . . . ,M , which guarantees that the padding algorithm
can be run in real time, with minimum delay of padded packets (just processing
time delay, no need to wait for following packets). This condition also enables
the padding device to be different from the source of packet flow.
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Figure 4.1 illustrates a block diagram of the padder. Packet belonging to
different application flows enter the edge device connecting the secure network
to the public, insecure network. The padder contains tables that give the
amount of overhead to be added as a function of the incoming packet length
and the application type it belongs to. Such tables can be computed once the
probability distributions of the packet lengths of the applications to be mixed
have been estimated (see next Section). Then, they are filled and periodically
refreshed by a background process that observes incoming traffic (the two up-
per blocks in the figure, connected with the large white arrow). From analysis
of this packet stream, classification of application flows is possible (traffic is
assumed to be uncoded in the secure network) and packet length statistics can
be estimated.
To read the proper table and apply padding, the padder box must know
the application the incoming packet belongs to. This information cannot be
obtained by classification in real time, since the initial packets of a flow must
be released outside to let the application progress. So, when classification is
possible in a reliable way, a number of packets have already been released with
no padding or a padding compute without knowledge of the correct table to
be used. This difficulty can be overcome by means of a cooperating secure
network, where some tag is added to application to be mixed, so that they can
be recognized by the padder since the very first packet of each flow. A more
practical situation can be envisaged in the common case where the secure net-
work reduces to a single host device. Then, padding and background length
statistics collection can be carried out by an internal process, e.g. embedded
in the operating system. Such a process can obviously know the exact appli-
cation/service each packet flow belongs to, since they are generated within the
same device under the control of a same operating system.
The obtained padded packet is enciphered, so as to protect confidentiality
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Figure 4.1: Block scheme of padder operation in case of trusted/insecure
network edge.
of payload and prevent the attacker from removing padding (encoder box ). At
the far end, packets are deciphered, padding is stripped off and clean packets
are forwarded to the appropriate application layer endpoint.
In the following, we focus on the padder box. The aim of the padder is
to alter packet length so as to confuse a given set of pre-defined application
protocols. The key idea is to add a random amount of padding so that lengths
of output packets appear as drawn from a same Probability Mass Function
(PMF) independently of the application that has actually generated them.
Let us focus on two application protocols (M = 2) and on a specific packet
within their respective flows, say the r-th one. We drop the subscript r for
the sake of simple notation. Let an = P(L(1) = n) and bn = P(L(2) = n)
for n = Lmin, . . . , Lmax. Practical values of minimum and maximum packet
lengths are e.g. 40 bytes ≤ Lmin ≤ 56 bytes, depending on options on IP or
TCP headers, and Lmax = 1500 bytes for most widespread access networking
technology. To keep notation simple, without losing generality, we set Lmin =
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1, i.e. the minimum length quantum (e.g. one byte), and Lmax ≡ `. We let
also Fa(n) = P(L(1) ≤ n) and Fb(n) = P(L(2) ≤ n).
We aim to make packet length series belonging to the two protocols indis-
tinguishable once packets are padded. So, it must be Y (1) ∼ Y (2) ∼ Y . Let
cn = P(Y = n). We search for a Probability Mass Function (PMF) {cn}1≤n≤`
among all those satisfying the constraint that only padding be non negative,
i.e. Y (i) = L(i) + U (i) with U (i) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. We show first the following:
Theorem: Let {an}1≤n≤` and {bn}1≤n≤` be the PMFs of lengths of packets
of two applications. Let {cn}1≤n≤` any PMF describing the padded lengths of
both applications. Then.
Fc(n) ≡
n∑
j=1
cj ≤ min {Fa(n), Fb(n)} , n = 1, . . . , `. (4.1)
Proof. Since only padding is allowed, the length of output packets is Y1 =
L(1) + U1 or Y2 = L
(2) + U2, where Y1 ∼ Y2 ∼ Y . Therefore, P(Y > k) ≥
P(L(1) > k) whence P(Y ≤ k) ≤ P(L(1) ≤ k). Similarly for the other random
variable, L(2). It follows that any output packet length PMF in case of padding
must satisfy P(Y ≤ k) ≤ min{P(L(1) ≤ k),P(L(2) ≤ k)} or
k∑
j=1
cj ≤ min

k∑
j=1
aj ,
k∑
j=1
bj
 , k = 1, . . . , ` (4.2)
q.e.d.
We aim at minimizing the amount of overhead due to padding. Given the
PMFs of the padder input packet lengths, this is the same as minimizing E[Y ].
We can prove the following:
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Theorem: Let {an}1≤n≤` and {bn}1≤n≤` be the PMFs of lengths of packets
of two applications. Then E[Y ∗] ≤ E[Y ] for any PMF {cn}1≤n≤` of the r.v.
Y under the non negative padding constraint, with the PMF {c∗n}1≤n≤` of the
r.v. Y ∗ given by
Fc∗(n) ≡
n∑
j=1
c∗j = min {Fa(n), Fb(n)} , n = 1, . . . , `. (4.3)
Proof. First, we argue Fc∗(n) is a proper Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF), if Fa(n) and Fb(n) are. It is non negative, monotonous non decreasing
and it attains 1 for n = `, since both Fa(n) and Fb(n) do so.
Further, we have
E[Y ∗] =
∑`
j=1
jc∗j =
∑`
j=1
[1− Fc∗(j)]
=
∑`
j=1
[1−min{Fa(j), Fb(j)}]
≤
∑`
j=1
[1− Fc(j)] = E[Y ]
where last inequality derives from eq. (4.1). q.e.d.
The PMF {cn}1≤n≤` is just the target common PMF of the packet length
at the output of the padder device to the insecure network. It is the optimum
one, i.e. the output packet length PMF with minimum mean value (hence
minimum average overhead, given the mean length of input packets) under
the constraint that only padding is applied (i.e. no packet fragmentation).
Once {cn}n=1,...,` is given, it is possible to compute the PMF of the random
overhead U , conditional on the input packet length of the i-th application,
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namely λ
(i)
h,k = P(U = h|L(i) = k) for h = 0, 1, . . . , ` − k; k = 1, . . . , ` and for
i = 1, 2. The values λ
(i)
h,k depend on the marginal PMF P(L(i) = k). As a
matter of fact, for i = 1 we have
cn = P(Y = n)
=
n∑
k=1
P
(
L(1) = k
)
P
(
L(1) + U = n|L(1) = k
)
=
n∑
k=1
akP
(
U = n− k|L(1) = k
)
=
n∑
k=1
akλ
(1)
n−k,k n = 1, . . . , `. (4.4)
The values of λ
(i)
h,k can be computed by Algorithm 1. At step k, we consider
the fraction of input packets of length k, i.e. ak: at the output we have a packet
with length n with probability
[∑n
j=1 cj −
∑k−1
j=1 aj}
]
/ak (provided this is
positive and less than 1). This is simply the probability of the output length
be not greater than n minus the probability mass of the output length PMF
already “assigned” to input packet of length less than k. Then, the conditional
probability that overhead U is no greater than n− k is
P(U ≤ n− k|L(1) = k) = min {1,max {0, zk,n}}
zk,n =
1
ak
 n∑
j=1
cj −
k−1∑
j=1
aj
 (4.5)
for k = 1, . . . , n and n = 1, . . . ` (as usual it is intended that
∑j2
j=j1
≡ 0 for
j1 > j2).
Let us assume that, for a fixed n, the smallest value of k such that Fc(n) <
Fa(k) be k
∗; then it is Fc(n) ≥ Fa(k) for k = 1, . . . , k∗ − 1. Note that it is
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Algorithm 1 PadAlg : Computation of the PMF of the padding overhead
conditional on the input packet length
1: for n← 1 to ` do
2: for k ← 1 to n do
3: z = 0
4: if ak > 0 then
5: z =
∑n
j=1 cj−
∑k−1
j=1 aj
ak
6: end if
7: γn−k,k = min {1,max {0, z}}
8: end for
9: end for
10: λ0,k = γ0,k
11: for k ← 1 to ` do
12: for h← 1 to `− k do
13: λh,k = γh,k − γh−1,k
14: end for
15: end for
1 ≤ k∗ ≤ ` and this is well defined since Fa(`) = 1 ≥ Fc(n) ∀n. Then, it is
zk,n ≥ 1, k = 1, . . . , k∗ − 1
zk∗,n =
1
ak∗
 n∑
j=1
cj −
k∗−1∑
j=1
aj
 ∈ [0, 1)
zk,n ≤ 0, k = k∗ + 1, . . . , n− 1.
Then, we have
P(Y ≤ n) =
n∑
k=1
akP(U ≤ n− k|L = k)
=
k∗−1∑
k=1
ak + ak∗zk∗,n =
n∑
j=1
cj = Fc(n)
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The arguments of the proofs as well as the algorithms can easily be gener-
alized to the case of M input PMFs of packet lengths that are to be confused
into a single target PMF. The key characteristic of this common PMF is
k∑
j=1
cj = min

k∑
j=1
a
(1)
j , . . . ,
k∑
j=1
a
(M)
j
 (4.6)
for k = 1, . . . , `.
4.1.2 Generalization to Conditional Packet Length PMFs
The Algorithm 1 (PadAlg) aims at computing an overhead length PMF used to
pad packets from M different application protocols, so that the marginal PMF
of the r-th packet of each application flow has a resulting length that is drawn
from a same PMF, irrespective of the specific application that generated that
packet. What we need to compute the target PMF and hence the conditional
pad overhead PMFs is knowledge of the PMF of the r-th packet emitted by
each application, i.e. a
(i)
k (r) = P(L(i)r = k), i = 1, . . . ,M ; k = 1, . . . , `; r ≥ 1,
where the subscript r of L
(i)
r refers to the order of occurrence of the packet
inside the flow it belongs to. According to the algorithms defined above, we
can compute a padded packet length PMF for each value of r, {cn(r)}n=1,...,`
This way we neglect correlation information. While marginal distribu-
tion of packet length is completely masked, we could expect some information
leakage still take place since subsequent packets belonging to a same flow have
correlated packet lengths. We can tackle this issue, at least for one-step de-
pendencies, by considering conditional PMFs instead of just marginal ones.
For the sake of notation, we consider two applications only, the generalization
to M being straightforward as done in eq. (4.6). Let ak(1) = P(L(1)1 = k) and
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bk(1) = P(L(2)1 = k); let also
a˜k|h(r) = P(L(1)r = k|L(1)r−1 = h)
b˜k|h(r) = P(L(2)r = k|L(2)r−1 = h)
with k, h = 1, . . . , ` and r ≥ 2. The target padded packet length PMF {cn|h(r)}
is computed by exactly the same expression as eq. (4.3), except that {a˜k|h(r)}k
and {b˜k|h(r)}k are fed as input for each given value of h instead of {ak(r)}k
and {bk(r)}k. Analogously, the PMF of the random padding to be applied to a
packet of length k belonging to e.g. application 1 is computed from {a˜k|h(r)}k
and {cn|h(r)}n as {λ˜j|k,h(r)}j = 1, . . . , ` − k for each given value of h and k.
Computational burden is strongly reduced by the typically high correlation
found in packet length sequences1, that imply {a˜k|h(r)}k is non null only for
few values of h.
4.1.3 Tradeoff between Information Leakage and Overhead
Let us return to focus on a specific message position, say the r-th one, within
the flow sequence. We drop the index r for the sake of simple notation. Assume
we know the pdfs ak = P (L
(1) = k) and bk = P (L
(2) = k), for k = 1, . . . , `.
Instead of L(1) + U
(1)
L ∼ L(2) + U (2)L ∼ L˜, partial masking requires that c(i)k ≡
P(L(i) + U (i)L = k) (i = 1, 2) satisfy the following constraint:
∑`
k=1
min{c(1)k , c(2)k } ≥ q (4.7)
where q is a similarity measure, with q ∈ [0, 1]. Complete flow masking is
recovered for q = 1, that forces c
(1)
k = c
(2)
k , ∀k.
1This is just another face of the good capability of statistical classifiers found in the
literature, as discussed in Chapter 1
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Algorithm 2 Partial Masking(q,a,b)
1: α = 1− q
2: {a′i}k=1,...,` = {ak}k=1,...,`
3: {b′k}k=1,...,` = {bk}k=1,...,`
4: for d← `− 1 to 0 do
5: for i← 1 to ` do
6: for j ← {i+ d, i− d} do
7: if 1 ≤ j ≤ ` then
8: m = min
{
a′i, b
′
j , α
}
9: a′i = a
′
i −m
10: b′j = b
′
j −m
11: α = α−m
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: end for
16: assert
∑`
k=1 c
′
k =
∑`
k=1 b
′
k =
∑`
k=1 a
′
k = 1− α
17: {c′i} = PadAlg({a′i}, {b′i})
18: {c(1)k } = {ak − a′k + c′k}
19: {c(2)k } = {bk − b′k + c′k}
Our purpose is to find two pdfs {c(1)k }1≤k≤` and {c(2)k }1≤k≤` that satisfy
eq. (4.7) and minimize the average overhead E[OH] ≡ Q1E[U (1)L ] +Q2E[U (2)L ].
To solve this problem we have developed algorithm 2. In that algorithm,
the function PadAlg is the Algorithm 1 and outputs the pdf {γk}1≤k≤` such
that
∑k
i=1 γi = min
{∑k
i=1 αi,
∑k
i=1 βi
}
(k = 1, . . . , `), for two given pdfs
{αk}1≤k≤` and {βk}1≤k≤`.
The algorithm takes as input the two pdfs, {ak}1≤k≤` and {bk}1≤k≤`, of
the message lengths of the two applications we want to mix. Each of them
is split in two components according to ak = a
′
k + a
′′
k and bk = b
′
k + b
′′
k for
k = 1, . . . , `. The two components are such that
∑`
k=1 a
′
k =
∑`
k=1 b
′
k = q. Let
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a new message of application 1 with length k arrive. With probability a′′k/ak
it is passed onto the enciphering algorithm as it is (no masking), while with
probability a′k/ak its length is modified according to additive masking so that
the conditional output length pdf is {c′k}/q = PadAlg({a′k}/q, {b′k}/q). This
partial masking yields an output pdf of message lengths equal to {c(1)k } given
in line 18 of algorithm 2, as we show in the following.
If u
(1)
j (h) denotes the conditional probability that padding is h ≥ 0 bytes,
given that the input message belongs to application 1 and has length j, then
c′k/q =
∑k
j=1 u
(1)
j (k − j)a′j/q. Then, the probability of a masked message of
length k at the output of the partial masking algorithm is c
(1)
k = ak(a
′′
k/ak) +∑k
j=1 aj(a
′
j/aj)u
(1)
j (k − j) = a′′k + c′k = ak − a′k + c′k, that is just line 18 of
algorithm 2. Entirely analogous argument applies to application 2.
The choice of the density portions {a′n} and {b′n} in the rows 4-15 of
the algorithm 2 is made so that the amount |∑`k=1 a′k · k −∑`h=1 b′h · h| is
minimized. In fact the algorithm gradually constructs them in an iterative
way, by excluding the most distant density portions of the two original pdfs,
until reaching a set of probabilities with weight q. The components {a′n}1≤n≤`
and {b′n}1≤n≤` are used to feed PadAlg, whose output is the pdf {c′n}1≤n≤`.
The resulting pdfs are given in lines 18 and 19 of algorithm 2. It can be
checked that these are proper pdfs and that they satisfy eq. (4.7).
4.1.4 Results
According to the scenario defined in Figures 3.1 and 4.1, we consider a col-
lection of traces (ground truth), made up of the ordered sequence of packet
lengths of flows belonging to different applications captured and/or generated
as commented in Section 2.5.
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No With padding
padding marginal PMFs conditional PMFs
m Iˆ(A;TA) Iˆ(A;TA) E[OH] Iˆ(A;TA) E[OH]
1 0.6316 0.0020 0.1275 0.0011 0.1261
2 0.6795 0.0453 0.1034 0.0024 0.0870
3 0.9919 0.0464 0.1234 0.0027 0.1049
4 0.8698 0.2692 0.1762 0.0474 0.0854
5 0.9971 0.1481 0.3717 0.0457 0.3399
Table 4.1: Average mutual information of the classifier based on the first
m packets of the application flows: scenario with two applications (SSH,
POP3).
Four machine learning algorithms described in 2.4 (K-means, Na¨ıve Bayes,
Logistic and Random Forest) are used in order to measure the information
leakage.
4.1.4.1 Additive Masking
The cumulative probability distribution functions (cpdfs) of the flow first
packet for the four considered applications is plotted in Figure 4.2 along with
the cpdf of the padded packets, {cn}. We are mixing applications with typi-
cally short packets (few hundred bytes) such as POP3, SSH and FTP-c, with
HTTP, whose packet lengths easily saturate to the maximum 1500 bytes. As a
consequence, it is apparent that the probability mass be concentrated around
length 100-150 and about 1400-1500. In the light of this, padding overhead is
expected to be large.
Results are shown in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3: the average mutual informa-
tion Iˆ(A;TA) (defined in 2.6) associated to the flow classifier K-means and
the average fraction of output bytes that are padding overhead (E[OH]) are
listed as a function of the number m of packets of each flow examined by the
classifier according to the overhead definition 2.20.
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative probability distribution function of the packet
sizes for the four considered applications (A1 = HTTP ; A2 = FTP − c;
A3 = SSH; A4 = POP3) and for the packets padded according to PMF
{cn} of eq. (4.6).
No With padding
padding marginal PMFs conditional PMFs
m Iˆ(A;TA) Iˆ(A;TA) E[OH] Iˆ(A;TA) E[OH]
1 0.6096 0.0005 0.3148 0.0005 0.3148
2 0.7938 0.0066 0.5100 0.0027 0.2399
3 0.8267 0.0727 0.6325 0.0710 0.4649
4 0.9093 0.1046 0.6315 0.0818 0.4466
5 0.9115 0.1255 0.6112 0.1131 0.4426
Table 4.2: Average mutual information of the classifier based on the first
m packets of the application flows: scenario with four applications (HTTP,
FTP-c, SSH, POP3).
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No With padding
padding marginal PMFs conditional PMFs
m Iˆ(A;TA) Iˆ(A;TA) E[OH] Iˆ(A;TA) E[OH]
1 0.8697 0.0001 0.1295 0.0001 0.1292
2 0.9441 0.0034 0.1570 0.0021 0.0757
3 0.9478 0.0013 0.1183 0.0010 0.0606
4 0.9943 0.0030 0.1463 0.0053 0.1062
5 0.9033 0.0254 0.2256 0.0003 0.1165
Table 4.3: Average mutual information of the classifier based on the first
m packets of the application flows: two applications tunneled inside SSH
connections (HTTP-over-SSH, SFTP).
The padding algorithm is effective in cancelling most of the information
provided by the flow classifier, which is otherwise quite successful in detecting
origin application, at least when a sufficient number of packets is considered
(e.g. m = 5). As m increases, a growing amount of information leaks through
the padder device, since correlation of the flow packet length sequence are
not masked in case of marginal padded packet length PMF or only partially
masked in case od one-step conditional padded packet length PMF.
With two application protocols to be mixed up (SSH and POP3, Table 4.1),
an almost perfect classifier (Iˆ(A;D) = 0.99 for m = 5) is turned into a poor or
even an extremely poor tool with random padding based on marginal PMFs
(about 0.15 residual average mutual information) or on conditional PMFs (less
than 0.05 average mutual information left). Overhead increases as the scope
m of the classifier grows, reaching between 34% and 37% of the output traffic.
Similar results are found in terms of effectiveness reduction of the classifier in
case four applications are considered (HTTP, FTP-c, SSH and POP3, Table
4.2). Overhead is much larger due to the remarkable difference of typical
message lengths in HTTP and the other application: the first one tends to
exhibit packets close to the maximum 1500 bytes size, the other three protocols
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Figure 4.3: Comparison between the successful classification probabilities
before and after additive masking for the scenario HTTP and FTP-c.
typically send packets between few tens and some hundreds of bytes.
A third different numerical example gives more striking results (Table 4.3).
In this case we consider application services tunneled inside SSH connections
(so that every packet is entirely encrypted). Random padding as defined in this
work is definitely effective in killing classifier capability, e.g. an information
leakage that makes the K-means classifier almost perfect for m = 4 is largely
obfuscated with only about 11% overhead traffic at the ouput of the padding
device in case of conditional PMFs and 15% overhead with marginal PMFs.
In general, conditional PMF approach has superior performance both in terms
of anonymization effectiveness and amount of required overhead.
In the figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 the probability of successful classification
Psucc (according to the relation 2.22) obtained from the four machine learning
before and after additive masking are compared.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison between the successful classification probabilities
before and after additive masking for the scenario FTP-c and VoIP.
Looking at these results we can observe all the machine learning, which
were very effective in the traffic classification, achieve a significant decreasing
in performance after additive masking. Due to lengths transformation the
Psucc’s approach the minimum value (equal to 50% in case of a scenario with
two classes).
Random Forest algorithm turns out to be the best among those used, and
it obtains the highest Psucc in all three scenarios analyzed.
4.1.4.2 Tradeoff between Information Leaks and Overhead
The graphs in Figs. 4.6 - 4.10 show the obtained results for the algorithm
described in Section 4.1.3. Figures 4.7 and 4.9 refer to Scenario 1 (SSH and
FTP-c flows), while Figs. 4.8 and 4.10 refer to Scenario 2 (HTTP over SSH
and SFTP flows, into SSH tunnels). We plot as a function of the masking
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Figure 4.5: Comparison between the successful classification probabilities
before and after masking for the scenario SSH and VoIP.
rate q the average overhead E[OH] in Figure 4.6 and Psucc in Figures 4.7 and
4.8. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 plot the trade-off between the information leakage
measured by Iˆ(A;TA) and the average overhead. Also here four different
classification algorithm have been considered.
The interesting indication of these results is that the amount of overhead
cannot be reduced significantly with respect to full masking, if strict leakage
requirements are set (q close to 1), yet substantial reduction of overhead with
respect to full masking can be attained, if a success probability Psucc of about
0.7-0.6 is acceptable (a trivial classifier can attain Psucc = 0.5). In that case,
we can fix q = 0.8, that leads to E[OH] about halving with respect to full
masking (scenario 2). A smaller gain is obtained in case of scenario 1. As for
the trade-off between Iˆ(A;TA) and E[OH], the smaller the average mutual
information leaked to the adversary, the larger the overhead required. The
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Figure 4.6: Average overhead as a function of the masking rate q for the
two considered scenarios.
trade-off appears to be much more favorable in case of SSH tunneled applica-
tion flows (scenario 2). Other tests with different application protocols (e.g.
VoIP) have been carried out, yielding similar behavior.
4.2 All Features Masking
In the next, we propose two new practical algorithms (Burst-by-Burst Padding
Only and Burst-by-Burst Statistical Additive) applicable to a message/burst
only based on features of previous messages/bursts.
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Figure 4.7: Probability of a successful classification as a function of the
masking rate q for the scenario SSH and FTP-c.
4.2.1 Burst by Burst Masking
The key idea we develop in this Section is to apply the optimized full masking
of Section 3.1.2 burst by burst, so that the decision on the masking flow can be
taken at each endpoint as the traffic flow runs. Given two applications, global
and local optimizations can be defined, only restricted to a sub-flow made up
of the messages belonging to a given burst, hence with a feature sub-vector
Xb = [Lb,Tb], where sub-vector size is equal to the number of messages of
the burst. The complexity of the ideal, full masking within a burst is limited,
since typical burst comprise one or few messages. The overall flow masking is
no more full, since correlations across bursts are not taken care of (masking
decision is taken burst by burst).
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Figure 4.8: Probability of a successful classification as a function of the
masking rate q for the scenario HTTP over SSH and SFTP.
In general, message padding, fragmentation and dummy messages can be
used. If only padding is used, we define the Burst-by-Burst Padding Only
(BbBPO) masking algorithm and minimum byte and time overhead is ob-
tained as follows for each burst. Given feature sub-vectors x
(i)
b = [l
(i)
b , t
(i)
b ]
of application i, i = 1, 2, the shortest of the two sub-vectors is padded out
with zeros. Then, the output burst feature sub-vector is yb = [λb, τb] with
λb = max{l(1)b , l(2)b } and τb = max{t(1)b , t(2)b }. Figure 4.11 shows an example
of message length masking with padding only for bursts of two applications.
Dark shadowed portions of messages are padding bytes.
A different practical masking algorithm can be defined by resorting to addi-
tive masking. Let V (i) denote a random variable representing a generic feature
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Figure 4.9: Trade-off between normalized mutual information and over-
head for the scenario SSH and FTP-c.
of a flow of application i (i = 1, . . . ,M). We define F
(i)
V (v) ≡ P(V (i) ≤ v).
With additive masking the masked feature V˜ is built as V˜ = V (i)+U (i), for i =
1, . . . ,M , with U (i) a suitable non-negative random variable such that the pdf
of V˜ is independent of i. In Section 4.1.1 it is shown that minimum overhead
additive masking is obtained by choosing FV˜ (v) = min{F (1)V (v), . . . , F (M)V (v)}.
This choice minimizes E[V˜ ], hence E[U (i)] for a given value of E[V (i)], i =
1, . . . ,M . Once FV˜ (v) is computed, the pdf of the U
(i)’s can be calculated;
then, given a sample v of V (i), the masking quantity is sampled from the pdf
of U (i), say u, and the masked feature value is v + u, with u ≥ 0.
The Burst-by-Burst Statistical Additive (BbBSA) masking paradigm can
be applied to the masking of a mix ofM applications, whose flows are described
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Figure 4.10: Trade-off between normalized mutual information and over-
head for the scenario HTTP over SSH and SFTP.
by the compact vector features X = [B,Θ]. As for burst number we let N˜ =
N (i)+U
(i)
N , i = 1, . . . ,M , so a flows with N
(i) = n is padded out with U
(i)
N = uN
bursts, whose lengths and epochs are chosen according to the pdfs of the
corresponding features. Let n˜ = n+uN be the resulting number of bursts, with
sizes B(i) = [B
(i)
1 , . . . , B
(i)
n˜ ] and gap times G
(i) = [Θ
(i)
2 −Θ(i)1 , . . . ,Θ(i)n˜ −Θ(i)n˜−1]
for the i-th application. Then, each burst size and gap time is masked as
B˜j = B
(i)
j + U
(i)
B,j and G˜j = G
(i) + U
(i)
G,j , j = 1, . . . , n˜. Once the sizes of bursts
of the masked flow are determined, message length and timing can be defined
according to a fixed, pre-defined scheme, independent of the input application
flow.
Additive masking as presented above is a practical algorithm, since it can
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Figure 4.11: Examples of message length masking of bursts for two appli-
cations.
be applied by each endpoint separately, burst by burst, as they arrive at the
endpoint. Knowledge of burst size and gap times statistics is required, but
the pdfs of the number of bytes to add to bursts and their delays can be
pre-computed, so that the masking device operations can be reduced to table
lookup. The device data base comprises M tables for each feature to be masked
(e.g. burst lengths). For a given feature V , the table of the i-th application
has a number of rows and columns equal to the number of possible outcomes
of the feature to be concealed. The entry (u, v) of the i-th table contains
the conditional probability P(U (i)V = u|V (i) = v), where UV is the additive
masking applied to V .
4.2.2 Results
In this Section we report about performance of practical algorithms described
in Subsection 4.2.1. First, we compare optimum full masking, Burst-by-
Burst Statistical Additive (BbBSA) masking, Burst-by-Burst Padding Only
(BbBPO) practical masking, and fixed pattern masking. We have considered
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Application Pair Opt. full BbBSA BbBPO Fixed Burst
masking Masking Masking Size
HTTP - SSH 0.3663 0.3704 0.4428 0.5059
HTTP - FTP-c 0.4104 0.4105 0.4358 0.5844
HTTP - POP3 0.4233 0.4324 0.4479 0.5951
HTTP - VoIP 0.4080 0.3933 0.4255 0.5571
SSH - FTP-c 0.3022 0.3564 0.3799 0.6082
SSH - POP3 0.3489 0.3808 0.3890 0.6285
SSH - VoIP 0.2936 0.3100 0.3824 0.5657
FTP-c - POP3 0.1869 0.2439 0.2710 0.5263
FTP-c - VoIP 0.2231 0.2384 0.3174 0.4872
POP3 - VoIP 0.2700 0.2793 0.3421 0.4987
HTTP over SSH - SFTP 0.2752 0.2823 0.3229 0.5187
Table 4.4: Average overhead introduced by practical and fixed burst size
masking algorithms for various application mixes (BbBSA = Burst-by-Burst
Statistical Additive; BbBPO = Burst-by-Burst Padding Only).
padding only in case of BbBPO since it gives rise to much simpler implemen-
tation than in case fragmentation is used and results in Subsection 3.1.3 point
out that the overhead penalty is marginal.
Results for the byte overhead, calculated according eq. (2.20), are shown
in Table 4.4 in case of compact feature vector [B,Θ] (burst sizes and epochs)
and by considering the first 12 bursts for each flow. Remarkably, BbBSA
masking incurs a minor penalty as for overhead with respect to optimized
full masking. It can be considered as a sort of lower bound of the practical
algorithms. Notice that it is possible that E[OH] for BbBSA be less than for
full masking, since BbBSA is a practical masking, hence it is not full masking,
i.e., it does not fulfill the requirement of removing any leakage. Much more
overhead is demanded by BbBPO masking and especially by the fixed pattern
masking, where a same size of all bursts has been set, with the best choice for
each application mix.
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Notice that only optimum full masking and fixed burst masking remove
any leakage of traffic flow features. Whereas the former is only a theoretical
benchmark and cannot be realized, the latter is quite easily implementable
and does not even require statistical data. The price to pay for this simplicity
is about doubling the overhead with respect to the optimum and also with
respect to the BbBSA masking. The appeal of the statistical practical masking
whose results are reported in the two central columns of Table 4.4 depends on
their capability of reducing leakage enough to make classification essentially
fail. Since correlations are not taken care of when masking is decided burst by
burst, we expect some information is leaked by statistical practical algorithms.
Figure 4.12 plots the mutual information Iˆ(A;TA) leaked by BbBPO masking
for some application mixes as a function of the number of bursts NB used by
the adversary for classification. The classification algorithm is Random Forest.
It is apparent that looking at the first few bursts does not yield a significant
amount of information that can be exploited by the adversary. As the number
of inspected bursts grows in the order of ten or more, a major leakage is found.
Correspondingly probabilities of successful classification range between 0.87
and 0.92 for NB  10.
These findings are confirmed by results in Table 4.5, that refer to BbBPO
masking applied to flows by considering up to 50 bursts. The first column
shows the values of the average overhead; time overhead in the second column
is calculated in the same way by replacing packet lengths with inter-packets
gap times. On the third column, the average packet delay introduced by the
masking device is displayed. The four columns of the Table 4.6 show the values
of Psucc obtained with the considered flow classification algorithms.
The results point out that, when we mask all flow features, burst structure,
packet lengths and timing information, we get a significant worsening of the
traffic load on the network compared with the optimal masking for packet
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Application Byte Time Average Packet
Pair Overhead Overhead Delay (ms)
HTTP - SSH 0.4363 0.4702 63.310
HTTP - FTP-c 0.4713 0.4239 32.756
HTTP - POP3 0.4408 0.4515 23.879
HTTP - VoIP 0.4523 0.4258 27.313
SSH - FTP-c 0.4210 0.4750 80.345
SSH - POP3 0.4274 0.4814 68.027
SSH - VoIP 0.4198 0.4692 72.255
FTP-c - POP3 0.3992 0.4314 35.263
FTP-c - VoIP 0.3983 0.4156 38.617
POP3 - VoIP 0.4322 0.4529 41.988
HTTP over SSH - SFTP 0.3856 0.4728 50.133
Table 4.5: Average byte and time overheads and average delay introduced
by BbBPO masking algorithm for various application mixes.
Application Na¨ıve Logistic Random K-means
Pair Bayes Forest
HTTP - SSH 0.6576 0.5303 0.8611 0.6905
HTTP - FTP-c 0.6863 0.5235 0.8779 0.7225
HTTP - POP3 0.5472 0.5094 0.8887 0.7080
HTTP - VoIP 0.5245 0.5112 0.8520 0.6324
SSH - FTP-c 0.5350 0.5900 0.9290 0.5825
SSH - POP3 0.5735 0.7725 0.9297 0.7180
SSH - VoIP 0.6019 0.5128 0.9102 0.6854
FTP-c - POP3 0.6715 0.6445 0.8914 0.6595
FTP-c - VoIP 0.6223 0.6355 0.8922 0.5922
POP3 - VoIP 0.5560 0.6326 0.9022 0.6976
HTTP over SSH - SFTP 0.5490 0.6606 0.8649 0.5712
Table 4.6: Psucc’s for the four classification algorithms considered.
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Figure 4.12: Average mutual information leaked by BbBPO masking as
a function of the number of burst NB used in the classification for various
application mixes.
lengths only. As a matter of fact, the overhead for most cases is more than
40% of the whole output traffic, and in one case it peaks to 47%. Average
delay ranges from few tens of ms up to about 80 ms; this is not an issue for
most applications but can become critical for VoIP.
In spite of the massive overhead introduced, the key result is that there is
still enough leakage for the adversary to be able to classify flow with rather high
accuracy, even though a suitable classifier must be chosen. Since intra-burst
masking is full (and even optimal), the leakage can be ascribed to correlations
among features of different bursts, that are not removed by additive mask-
ing. These considerations are also confirmed by Figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15
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Figure 4.13: Comparison between the successful classification probabilities
before and after BbBPO masking for the scenario HTTP and FTP-c.
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Figure 4.14: Comparison between the successful classification probabilities
before and after BbBPO masking for the scenario FTP-c and VoIP.
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Figure 4.15: Comparison between the successful classification probabilities
before and after BbBPO masking for the mix SSH and VoIP.
which show the comparison between the information leaks before and after
the BbBPO masking. The comparison of the practical masking in Figures 4.7
and 4.8 with q = 1 with results in Table 4.6 show that additive masking can
be effective if the adversary is limited to observation of the features of a small
number of flow packets, as required to attain real time classification, but it
fails if the adversary can take the time to observe the flow at length.
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Chapter 5
Masking Irrespective of the
Application
In this Chapter we aim to approach the problem of applying masking to a
packet traffic flow carried in an encrypted channel, irrespective of the applica-
tion(s) it comes from. Information leakage is stopped by means of traffic fea-
ture reshaping, specifically packet lengths and inter-arrival times. We address
two contributions: i) it is shown that under the constraint of perfect privacy
(namely, cancelation of any information leakage), the optimum masker shapes
the protected traffic flow into a fixed length, fixed rate output packet flow;
ii) we discuss a heuristic approach to reduce the amount of overhead at the
output of the masking device by releasing some controlled information.
As for the Chapter organization, the traffic masking system is introduced
in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 is devoted to masking optimization. Numerical
examples are presented in Section 5.3, based on real traffic traces.
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5.1 Masking Packet Traffic Flows
The reference scenario that we analyze in this Chapter is slightly different from
that described in the Chapter 2.
Let us consider two endpoints, denoted with A and B, and a packet flow
exchanged between A to B. We focus on A → B direction. For ease of
language, the term packet is used to refer to data units of the traffic flow,
even if they could belong to a layer different from network one. A and B
communicate via a secure channel through an insecure network. The adversary
can capture packets at will in the insecure network and knows a priori traffic
statistics. He can carry out traffic analysis to attack user privacy as discussed
in Chapter 1.
Let Lr and Tr be the lengths of the r-packet and the time elapsing between
the (r−1)−th and the r-th packets as generated at A (r-th inter-packet time).
We denote the r-th packet arrival time at A as ta,r: then ta,r = ta,r−1 +Tr. We
assume both L’s and T ’s can be modeled as drawn from wide-sense stationary
processes, so that the for any r we have Lr ∼ L and Tr ∼ T , with L and T being
random variables with at least finite first two moments. From the discussion
above we know that the sequences {Lr}r∈Z and {Tr}r∈Z carry information
about the traffic flow content, that we refer to generically as a random variable
Φ.
The anonymity in the network can be defined after [41] by using the condi-
tional uncertainty of the flow content Φ with respect to eavesdropper’s obser-
vations, denoted with Ω (packet lengths and inter-packet times of the observed
packet flow for each direction). The degree of traffic masking is measured by
the normalized equivocation α = H(Φ|Ω)/H(Φ), where H(L) is the average
entropy of the random variable L. Perfect privacy corresponds to α = 1. In
that case, observation of Ω does not yield any additional information about Φ
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Figure 5.1: Sketch of the end-to-end connection with traffic masking: def-
inition of in and out inter-packet inter-arrival times and packet length.
than that provided by the prior probability distribution of Φ. In general, the
interpretation of α comes from Fano Inequality: equivocation provides a lower
bound to the error probability of the eavesdropper in decoding the flow side
information correctly. To cancel any information leakage we replace original
packet lengths and inter-packet times with two new sequences, drawn from
random process independent of the original ones, so that the resulting Ω has
no relationship with Φ and it is α = 1.
A general scheme of the masking device is given in Fig. 5.1. Let Yr and
Ur be sequences of packet lengths and inter-packet time intervals, chosen for
the masked traffic flow. The output packet departure times are denoted as td,r
and td,r = td,r−1 + Ur. The masking device shapes the input original traffic
flow so as to impose that the output flow r-th packet has payload length Yr
and it is sent at time td,r.
The logical block structure of the packet masking device is shown in Fig.
5.2. First, the input packet with length L is broken into N new packets of
lengths Y1, . . . , YN , whose length are drawn from the output packet length
probability distribution function fY (·), so that Y1 + · · ·+ YN−1 < L and Y1 +
· · ·+YN ≥ L. The bytes of the input packet are carried by the newly generated
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Figure 5.2: Masking device with packet length and gap times masking.
fragments. A header of length H is added to each fragment to form the output
packet. The header carries the information required to reassemble the original
packet at the other end of the secure channel. Those new packets are enqueued
in a FIFO buffer. At output departure time td,r, a packet is taken from the
data buffer and sent to the output. If the data buffer is empty, a dummy packet
is sent to the output, again with length taken from the pdf fY (·). Overhead
sources aref fragmenting, padding and dummy packets.
In the following, we optimize the choice of the pdfs of the output packet
lengths and inter-arrival times of the masking device, by minimizing overhead
for a given requirement on the average delay through the device.
5.2 Masking Device Optimization
Let us consider a masking device with output link capacity C, receiving an
input packet flow described by inter-arrival times Tr and packet lengths Lr.
The masking device shapes the traffic by emitting at the output packets with
payload lengths Yr and a header length H, within time intervals of duration Ur.
We assume the average values of all these processes are given. Let λ ≡ 1/E[T ]
and µV ≡ E[V ] for any random variable V .
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The long term average input rate of the masking device is λµL, while
the output bit rate including overhead is (H + µY )/µU . So, the long term
average fraction of overhead at the output of the masking device is η = 1 −
(λµLµU )/(H + µY ). We aim at minimizing the delay through the masking
device for a given value of η. Since the mean delay is a decreasing function
of η, this is equivalent to minimizing the overhead η for a given mean delay
constraint.
The evolution of the masking buffer can be described by the continuous
time random process defined as the buffer content at time t, Q(t). We consider
the random sequence Qn ≡ Q(t+d,n), n ≥ 0, that represents the amount of bytes
stored in the buffer immediately after the departure of the n-th output packet
with payload Yn. If we assume enough buffering space is provided so that we
can neglect overflows, the sequence Qn obeys a Lindley recursion:
Qn = max{0, Qn−1 +An − Yn}, n ≥ 1 (5.1)
where Q0 = 0 and An represents the amount of bytes arrived at the queue
during time interval (td,n−1, td,n] with td,n = td,0 + U1 + · · ·+ Un and n ≥ 1.
An explicit form of Qn can be derived as:
Qn = max
{
0, max
1≤ν≤n
{
n∑
i=ν
Ai −
n∑
i=ν
Yi
}}
(5.2)
For ease of notation, in the following we assume
∑b
i=a ≡ 0 for a > b.
Then, it follows
E[Qn] =
∫
An
fAn(a)da
∫
Yn
fYn(y)qn(a,y) dy (5.3)
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where qn(a,y) = max1≤ν≤n+1 {
∑n
i=ν ai −
∑n
i=ν yi}, fV (v) denotes the prob-
ability density function of the random variable V and An = [A1, . . . , An],
Yn = [Y1, . . . , Yn]. The random vectors An and Yn are independent by con-
struction of the masking device, to achieve perfect privacy.
The function max1≤ν≤n+1 {
∑n
i=ν ai −
∑n
i=ν yi} is convex with respect to
each of the variables yi. As a matter of fact, let cr ≡ max1≤ν≤r{
∑n
i=ν ai−∑n
i=ν,i 6=r yi} and br ≡ maxr+1≤ν≤n+1 {
∑n
i=ν ai −
∑n
i=ν yi}. Then, g(yr) ≡
max1≤ν≤n+1 {
∑n
i=ν ai −
∑n
i=ν yi} = max{br, cr − yr}. We can verify that the
function g(z) is convex: for any α ∈ [0, 1], z1 and z2 we have cr − αz1 − (1−
α)z2 = α(cr− z1) + (1−α)(cr− z2) ≤ αmax{br, cr− z1}+ (1−α) max{br, cr−
z2} = αg(z1)+(1−α)g(z2). Since it is also br ≤ αg(z1)+(1−α)g(z2). we have
g(αz1 + (1− α)z2) = max{br, cr − αz1 − (1− α)z2} ≤ αg(z1) + (1− α)g(z2).
Since the integrand in eq. (5.3) is convex with respect to each of the vari-
ables yi, i = 1, . . . , n, and the random variables Yn are i.i.d. and independent
1
of An, we can apply Jensen’s inequality and deduce E[Qn] ≥ E[QDn ] where
E[QDn ] =
∫
An
max
1≤ν≤n+1
{
n∑
i=ν
ai − (n− ν + 1)µY
}
fAn(a) da (5.4)
with equality iff the random variables Yi are deterministic. E[Q
D
n ] is the aver-
age queue length at td,n in case of deterministic pdf of the Y ’s.
The random variables Qn and Q
D
n converge to proper random variables
Q and QD, i.e. there exists a stable, stationary limiting state of the queue as
n → ∞, if µA − µY = λµLµU − µY < 0, that is to say the average drift of
the queue in negative. Under this assumption, eq. (5.4) yields in the limit as
n→∞ the inequality E[Q] ≥ E[QD], with equality if the random variables Yi
have deterministic pdf.
1This is the key to apply Jensen’s inequality.
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This proves that the average masking device queue length is minimized by
choosing a deterministic pdf with mean Y0 ≡ µY for the output packet payload
length Y .
As for the interval lengths Ui, let us consider the workload or unfinished
work in the queue at time t, W (t). We consider the random sequence Wn ≡
W (t−a,n), n ≥ 0, that represents the amount of workload in the queue found
by the n-th arriving input packet. If Sn is the amount of work brought in the
queue by the n-th arriving packet, we can write2
Wn+1 = max{0,Wn + Sn − Tn+1} (5.5)
for n ≥ 1 and W1 = 0. Analogous to the case of Qn, eq. (5.5) can be made
explicit as
Wn+1 = max
1≤ν≤n
{
0,
n∑
i=ν
Si −
n+1∑
i=ν+1
Ti
}
(5.6)
To ease notation, let `j(L) = dL1/Y0e+ · · ·+ dLj/Y0e; so
E[Wn+1] =
∫
(Ln,Tn)
fLn,Tn(x, t)dxdt
∫
Un
fUn(ϑ)Mn dϑ
with
Mn(x, t, ϑ) = max
1≤ν≤n
0,
`n(x)∑
i=`ν−1(x)+1
ϑi −
n+1∑
i=ν+1
ti
 (5.7)
The integrand Mn is convex with respect to each ϑi, by an entirely similar
argument as in the case of eq. (5.3). By applying Jensen’s inequality, it follows
that E[Wn+1] ≥ E[WDn+1], where WD denotes the workload in case the random
2An input packet that finds the queue empty has to wait for the next output sending
time, hence it has a nonnull wail equal to the residual time random variable associated to U ,
thabks to the independence of the times U of the queue state and input process; in that case
we should add a term E[U2]/(2E[U ]); this term is minimized too when U has a deterministic
pdf.
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variables Uj are deterministic for all j ≥ 1. If the limiting random variable for
n→∞ exists, namely if the queue is stable, the result applies to the limiting
random variable, i.e. E[W ] ≥ E[WD] with equality iff the random variable U
is deterministic with mean U0 ≡ µU .
As a result, the average delay of the masking device queue is minimized,
for a given overhead fraction η, if we choose the output shaping with constant
amounts of bytes sent out at constant times, as in circuit switching.
5.3 Numerical Results
According to the result in Section 5.2, the optimum masking device under the
constraint of perfect privacy consists of fragmenting each input packet into
fixed length fragments and sending fragments out to the link at constant rate.
Let Y0 be the length of the output fragment payload, H be the output packet
header length, U0 be the packet inter-departure time at the output of the
masking device and C the output link capacity. It must be (Y0 +H)/C ≤ U0.
For numerical examples, we assume H = 20 bytes.
In the following we detail the overhead calculation, define a “relaxed”
masking device where some information on the packet length distribution is
leaked aiming at a reduction of overhead, and then present numerical results.
5.3.1 Overhead
The average number of bytes per second entering the masking device is λE[L],
while the average number of bytes out of the buffer of the masking device
are (Y0 + H)/U0. So the average fraction of bytes of overhead is η = 1 −
λE[L]
(Y0+H)/U0
. The average fraction of overhead due to dummy packets is ηd =
1−λU0E[dL/Y0e]; the average fraction of padding and fragmentation overhead
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per packet are ηp =
Y0E[dL/Y0e]−E[L]
(H+Y0)E[dL/Y0e] and ηf =
H
H+Y0
respectively. It can be
checked that η = (1− ηd)(ηp + ηf ) + ηd.
The feasible range for η is
1− E[L]
E[dL/Y0e](Y0 +H) < η ≤ 1−
λE[L]
C
provided that Y0 satisfies λE[dL/Y0e](H + Y0)/C < 1. Once we fix feasible
values of η and Y0, the value of U0 is given by U0 = (H + Y0)(1− η)/(λE[L]).
5.3.2 Relaxed Masking Device
Numerical values of the mean delay and of the average overhead frac-
tion have been obtained by considering a sample IP traffic trace from the
CAIDA repository, namely the trace corresponding to the capture file equinix-
sanjose.dirA.20120119-125903.UTC.anon.pcap. C = 10 Gbps is the link ca-
pacity. The value of E[T ] = 1/λ for the considered sample trace is 1.9027 µs.
The histogram of packet lengths of the sample trace is shown in Figure 5.3.
This trace comprises 28744877 IPv4 packets (overall about 21.7 IPv4 GB)
and 1408949 IPv4 flows.
A strong concentration of most probable values can be noticed. About
40% of packets have close to maximum length, beyond 1400 bytes. More than
30% of packets are quite small, with lengths in the order of 100 bytes or less.
This suggests that a single value of output packet length Y0 can hardly strike a
good compromise, although we know that it is optimum, given the full privacy
constraint. If we accept that the fraction of “small” packets as opposed to
“long” packets can be observed at the output of the masking device, that is
to say if we give up full privacy only to leak this specific information, we can
define a dual-length masking device, where input packets are sent to one of
two queues depending on their length (see Figure 5.4). Given a threshold value
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Figure 5.3: Histogram of packet lengths for the sample IP packet trace
used in the numerical example.
Y1, if the incoming packet has length L ≤ Y1 it is queued in the upper buffer,
where the output fixed length is Y1. If instead the input packets has L > Y1, it
is sent to the lower queue, where we set the output packet fixed length to the
maximum expected input value, denoted with Y2. According to the histogram
of packet lengths in Figure 5.3. good choices for the output payload lengths
are Y1 = 100 bytes and Y2 = 1480 bytes.
Given the desired output rate Cout, the values of the emission intervals U1
and U2 of the two queues are chosen so that the average load % on the two
queues be the same, i.e., λqE[dL/Y1e]U1 = λ(1− q)U2, where q = P(L ≤ Y1).
Then, (H +Y1)/U1 + (H +Y2)/U2 = Cout and for each given value of Cout the
corresponding value of % can be calculated.
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Figure 5.4: Logical scheme of the dual buffer masking device.
5.3.3 Simulation of the Masking Device
The workload process of the masking device can be found by simulation, once
the sequences of input packet lengths and inter-arrival times are given. For the
single buffer device, given the values of Y0 and U0, we can write a recurrence for
the workload Wn soon after the n-th packet arrival. If Wn−1 − Tn is positive,
then Wn = Wn−1 − Tn + Sn, where Sn = dLn/Y0eU0. If instead Wn−1 − Tn
is negative, a time U0d(Tn −Wn−1)/U0e − (Tn −Wn−1) has to elapse before
the server can start serving the packet(s) generated by the new arrival. This
is the result of the output being rigidly clocked at one output packet per time
interval U0. Summing up, we have:
Wn = Wn−1 − Tn + U0
(⌈
max{0, Tn −Wn−1}
U0
⌉
+
⌈
Ln
Y0
⌉)
(5.8)
for n ≥ 1, initialized with W0 = 0.
Trace driven simulations of the masking device have been carried out with
the packet length and inter-arrival times extracted from the CAIDA trace
described above. The CAIDA trace is made up of carried traffic over a link,
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Figure 5.5: Example of correction of arrival times of packets (timestamps
as observed in the CAIDA trace) of a same application flow to account for
the effect of the masking device in the flow loop.
so that we have to account for the effect of the insertion of the masking device
buffer on packet inter-arrival times. This effect arises because of conversational
applications, where a packet in one direction triggers a response and the next
packet in that direction can only arrive after the response has been received. If
a delay element is introduced in the data path, the inter-arrival times between
consecutive packets belonging to a same application flow are affected by the
delay. Application flows are identified on the basis of the values of the IP source
address, IP destination address, source port and destination port, provided the
gap between two consecutive packets be less than Tthresh = 10 sec.
For a packet flow, let Pr the r-th packet of the flow and ta,r its original
timestamp in the measured trace (r ≥ 1). Let Wr be the delay of the r-th
packet through the masking device. Then, the arrival time of the subsequent
packet of the same flow is delayed to the corrected arrival time tb,r, to account
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Figure 5.6: Performance of masking: average overhead vs. output bit rate.
for the effect of the masking device on the traffic, that is we let tb,r+1 =
tb,r + ta,r+1 − ta,r +Wr (see Figure 5.5).
5.3.4 Performance Results
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 plot respectively the average overhead and the average
delay through the masking device as a function of the output bitrate for some
values of Y0. The general behaviour of these curves is characterized by a
monotonic trend. The overhead for each curve starts from a minimum value
between 0.3 and 0.4 and increases until reaching a value between 0.6 and 0.7.
Only for Y0 = 20 bytes we have a curve significantly higher compared to the
other ones, with overhead between 0.6 and 0.85. The smallest overhead, equal
to 0.3, is achieved by the dual buffer masking device.
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Figure 5.7: Performance of masking: average delay vs. output bit rate
The trade-off between the average delay and the overhead is shown in
Figure 5.8, for some values of Y0 and for the device with dual buffer. Samll
delays can be obtained at the price of very large overhead values. If a masking
delay up to about 20µs can be introduced, the dual buffer masking device leads
to overhead values of 0.3, i.e., 30% of the output rate is masking overhead.
This is not as bad a result, considering that privacy protection is essentially
complete, the only leaked information being the fraction of the overall input
traffic consisting of short packets.
Figures 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 shows how the overhead is distributed among
padding, fragmentation and dummy packets for Y0 = 100, 1480 bytes and
for the dual buffer device. When Y0 = 100 bytes we can observe that the
overhead is mainly dominated by dummy packets, to which a good percentage
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Figure 5.8: Performance of masking: masking device trade-off between
average delay and average overhead.
of fragmentation overhead is added. With Y0 = 1480 bytes the amount of
overhead due to padding is very high and significantly increases the total
overhead, while no fragmentation is required. Figure 5.11 shows how the dual
buffer device allows to obtain a lower overhead by almost eliminating the
fragmentation overhead.
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Figure 5.9: Contribution of different overhead sources: Y0 = 100 bytes.
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Figure 5.10: Contribution of different overhead sources: Y0 = 1480 bytes.
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Figure 5.11: Contribution of different overhead sources: double buffer
masking device.
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Chapter 6
Final remarks and outlook
An increasing amount of networking research is focusing on traffic flow classi-
fication, since it can be useful for enforcement of security policies and traffic
filtering, or it can support quality of service mechanisms. In particular, sev-
eral methods of classification based on statistical analysis of traffic patterns
and machine-learning techniques have been proposed and analyzed. Statisti-
cal classification takes some features of the flow packets (e.g. packet lengths,
inter-arrival times, direction) and exploits these information to infer which
application or service is running those packets, among a set of possible al-
ternatives. Furthermore, based on packet features and possibly other context
informational, it is shown that other type of privacy breaking of supposedly
end-to-end secure channels exist; as matter of example web pages identifica-
tion, language/phrase detection in VoIP communication have been successfully
demonstrated against encrypted channels.
In this Thesis I aimed at investigating a complementary viewpoint, namely
protection of privacy against traffic analysis. The same study highlighted how
much effort and how complex it is to obfuscate the information leaked by traffic
features. We defined the security model pointing out what the ideal target of
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masking is, and we defined the some optimized and practically implementable
masking algorithms, yielding a trade-off between privacy and overhead/com-
plexity of the masking algorithm.
6.1 What Have We Achieved?
The first interesting finding is that Optimum Masking in Chapter 3, even if it
is not feasible for transactional, interactive applications, is useful to character-
ize the full concealment case and it offers a theoretical bound on the amount
of overhead necessary to achieve perfect secrecy. It also has shown that frag-
menting does not achieve significantly better performance than simple padding
as far as overhead-obfuscation trade-off is concerned.
Considering Practical Masking, numerical results, based on measured In-
ternet traffic traces, point out that a basic distinction must be done between
real time adversary and off line adversary, observing features of an extended
segment of the flow. In the former case, even if some information useful to the
adversary leaks when relaxing to practical masking from full masking, still it
appears that classification is essentially impaired (success probabilities of best
algorithms we could find are below 0.6 in case of two applications). This is
tied to the limited number of features used by the adversary, compelled by the
need to decide on a class of the observed masked flow in real time, as the flow
starts. Things turn out to be completely different if the adversary can take
time to classify the flow and observe its features over several bursts, in the or-
der of tens. In that case practical masking, though canceling any information
useful for classification inside each burst, cannot remove entirely correlations
across features of different bursts1. So, statistical, practical masking, even
though it minimized overhead burst by burst, still introduces a considerable
1This is similar, though much more complex, to mono-alphabetic ciphering, when attacked
by exploiting language redundancy, hence correlation.
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amount of overhead while failing to protect privacy against an off line adver-
sary. Another question concerns the amount of data requested in advance by
the masking device, in order to carry out an accurate process of obfuscation.
In fact, it requires knowledge of estimates of the probability density functions
for all used features of the considered M applications. As the duration of a
flow grows up, the amount of data required becomes very high and quite hard
to estimate reliably.
Our numerical investigation gives merit to simpler masking approaches,
that give up to global or local optimization leveraging on statistical masking
and resort instead to rigid, fixed pattern masking. While increasing overhead
with respect to statistical masking, as expected since no optimization is at-
tempted with fixed masking, yet that approach removes any information that
could be exploited by the classification adversary, preserves implementation
simplicity, and overhead price is not terribly greater than that entailed by op-
timized solutions (within a factor of 2 from the full, ideal optimized masking),
at least in cases we have experimented.
A different and potentially promising approach we had pursued in Chapter
5 is the masking irrespective of the application(s) it comes from. Given full
privacy is required, the optimum masking device shall shape the packet flow so
that fixed length packets at fixed times are sent through the insecure network.
In this context dummy packets are the major source of overhead, due to input
traffic burstiness. Mitigation of overhead can be obtained by exploiting the
input packet length pdf and let some minor information leak through the
masking device.
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